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Abstract
ZUBEYIR KILINC: Wage Bargaining, Labor Market Institutions and Business
Cycles.
(Under the direction of Richard Froyen.)
This dissertation investigates the impacts of labor market institutions on the business
cycles. The first chapter builds a DSGE search and match model that can capture the labor
market facts and explain the business cycle facts within a tractable framework. The basic
framework incorporates labor market frictions to the standard new Keynesian model and
extends it with staggered wage contracts. The empirical performance of the model is tested
by the impulse responses of the key macroeconomic variables to a monetary policy shock. It
shows that incorporating search and matching frictions and a bargaining framework into the
baseline new Keynesian model can generate a lower response for inflation and the real wage
to a monetary policy shock and can explain some of the labor market facts simultaneously.
The second chapter analyzes the effects of alternative labor market institutions on the
responses of key macroeconomic variables. It considers severance payments, unemployment
benefits and worker’s bargaining power. The impulse responses of key macroeconomic vari-
ables are derived under alternative parameterizations for these institutions. It finds that the
severance payments do not have an impact on the responses. Increasing the unemployment
benefits makes key macroeconomic variables less responsive to disturbances where increas-
ing worker’s bargaining power makes output more responsive and inflation less responsive to
macroeconomic shocks.
Third chapter explores the differences between the characteristics of the business cycles in
the US and the euro area. It first compares the features of the business cycles dated by the
NBER and CEPR; then, it looks at the characteristics of the business cycles derived from the
real GDP and industrial production. It finds that although the results of a comparison of the
features of the business cycles of the US and the euro area differ depending on the time period
iii
considered and data used in the analysis, the business cycles have very different characteristics
in the two areas. Thus, the model in the second chapter can be used to answer a question of
to what extent the labor market institutions are responsible for the differences in the features
of business cycles in different economies.
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Chapter 1
Staggered wage contracts and Nash
bargaining
1.1 Introduction
The new Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models have served as a workhorse
in explaining the relationships among money, inflation and business cycles for decades. These
models incorporate imperfect competition and nominal rigidities into an individually optimiz-
ing framework and focus on the demand-side effects of monetary policy.1 While these models
have made significant progress in explaining the relationships mentioned above, they flawed
in two ways. First, Walsh (2005) and Trigari (2006) state that the first generation of these
models do not replicate the responses of output and inflation to monetary policy shocks as
they are observed in the data. The data suggests that following a monetary policy shock
response of inflation dies out very slowly and large and persistent response of output follows a
hump-shaped path. Moreover, the inflation is also found to respond by a moderate amount.2
Second, these models do not explain the stylized facts in the labor market such as the exis-
tence of unemployment in equilibrium, low volatility in real wage, lower employment volatility
compared with unemployment volatility and the Beveridge curve relationship. In the baseline
1Early examples of new Keynesian models are Yun (1996), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Goodfriend
and King (1997), Gali and Gertler (1999) and McCallum and Nelson (1999).
2See Nelson (1998), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Bernanke nd Mihov (1998) for the
response of inflation and Estrella and Fuhrer (2002) for the response of output.
new Keynesian model, the existence of unemployed workers is ruled out by the assumption of
a frictionless perfectly competitive labor market. Moreover, due to the same assumption, the
real wage is equated to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure.
This results in a very significant change in hours worked and the real wage in the case of a
monetary policy shock.3
Researchers tried to overcome these shortcomings by extending the baseline model in sev-
eral ways such as including structural inflation inertia, adding habit persistence, assuming
variable capital utilization, incorporating sticky wages and adding labor market frictions.4
Recent studies including Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2001), Smets and Wouters (2003),
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Levin, Onatski, Williams and Williams (2005)
proved that incorporating labor market frictions would improve the understanding of business
cycle fluctuations. In other words, by concentrating on labor market frictions, it might be pos-
sible to simultaneously generate desired responses of inflation and output to monetary policy
shocks while capturing the labor market dynamics.
If one wants to incorporate labor market frictions into the new Keynesian model, search
and matching model, along with the works of Mortensen and Pissarides,5 is going to be a
natural candidate.6 According to Shimer (2005) this model is attractive due to a couple of
reasons. First, it is analytically tractable and it describes the way the labor market functions
in an appealing way. Second, the model is able to deliver rich and intuitive comparative statics.
However, the conventional Mortensen and Pissarides model is blamed for not being able to
account for some of the business cycle facts. In particular, under standard calibrations of
parameters it cannot account for labor market volatility observed in the data. This idea has
recently been discussed by Costain and Reiter (2003), Hall (2005), Shimer (2005), Hagedorn
3See Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997) and Bernanke and Mihov (1998).
4See Gali and Gertler (1999), Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), Sbordone (2002), Gali, Gertler and Lopez-
Salido (2001), Smets and Wouters (2003), Blanchard and Gali (2005), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005)
and Levin, Onatski, Williams and Williams (2005) for examples.
5See Pissarides (1990), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994, 1999) and Pissarides (2000)
6For recent examples of search and matching models, see Gerke and Rubart (2003), Trigari (2004), Christoffel
and Linzert (2005), Krause and Lubik (2005), Walsh (2005), Trigari (2006), Gertler and Trigari (2009), and
Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2008).
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and Manovskii (2008) and Mortensen and Nagypal (2007). For an example to the facts that
conventional model falls short of explaining is the low volatility of the real wage as observed
in the data. In the conventional model the wages are determined by period-by-period Nash
bargaining between firms and workers. This results in a high volatility in real wage. To
improve the empirical performance of the conventional model Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005)
incorporate an ad hoc real wage stickiness to the models they employ. They find that sticky
wages assumption results in a lower volatility in the real wage. In the literature there are some
other prominent works that show that introducing sticky wages assumption to the dynamic
general equilibrium macroeconomic framework improves the empirical performance of that
model. Recent examples are Smets and Wouters (2003) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
(2005). Gertler and Trigari (2009), however, mention that ad hoc sticky wages assumption
must have primitive forces behind it.
Basic purpose of this chapter is to create a model that is able to capture the labor market
facts while generating impulse responses of the key macroeconomic variables to a monetary
policy shock as observed in the data. Following the findings in the literature above, a search-
theoretic model is employed. The basic framework incorporates labor market frictions to the
standard new Keynesian model and extends it with staggered wage contracts. Among a lot
of alternative search-theoretic models,7 search and matching model provided by Gertler and
Trigari (2009) is chosen. In that study, the authors extend the model of Trigari (2004) with
staggered wage contracts in a non-monetary environment.
The agents operating in the economy are households, intermediate firms, retailers, a final
good producer and monetary authority. The households maximize their utility and if they
are matched with an open vacancy they are hired by the intermediate firms. The search
and matching frictions and bargaining over the wage occur at this level of the economy. The
unemployed workers search for a job and firms post vacancies. At each period only a fraction
of the firms are allowed to bargain over the wage with their existing workforces. There are
two side effects of the assumption that only a fraction of the workers are allowed to bargain at
7For a detailed analysis on search-theoretic models see Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2005).
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each period: horizon effect and spillover effects. The horizon effect stems from the difference
between the time horizons of the bargaining worker and bargaining firm. The source of the
spillover effects is the difference between the average market wage and contract wage. There
are direct spillover effects and indirect spillover effects. Retailers buy intermediate goods at
their marginal cost and produce the retail goods without any other cost. The retailers set
their prices as in Calvo (1983). Final good producer buys all the goods produced by retailers
in a monopolistically competitive market and produce the final good that is available for
consumption. The final good producer employs a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator.
To test the empirical performance of the model, the model is calibrated according to the
US economy and the impulse responses of the key macroeconomic variables to a one standard
deviation shock to the nominal interest rate under alternative specifications are derived. First
specification is the case of a frictionless economy. In the second case sticky prices assumption
is introduced and the impacts of this assumption on the impulse responses are observed. In
the final case sticky wages assumption is incorporated to the framework. In the final case,
two subcases are considered. In the first subcase the impulse responses when the spillover
effects are not in present are derived. In the second subcase, the spillover effects are allowed
to operate and the impulse responses are derived accordingly.
The framework of this study differs from that of Gertler and Trigari (2009) such that this
model is a monetary model with nominal price rigidities. With price rigidities, the model
is capable of capturing the adjustments in the prices and generate responses of inflation to
shocks. The differences between this study and Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2008) are: First,
this study considers real wage rigidity instead of nominal wage rigidity; second, this study
calibrates the model according to the US economy where Gertler et al. (2008) estimate their
model with Bayesian techniques; third, the focus of this study is the impulse responses of
variables to a monetary policy shock where they focus on productivity shock and investment
shock; fourth, this study investigates the impacts of alternative assumptions of sticky prices
and sticky wages on the responses of macroeconomic variables where they consider only the
full model with all rigidities.
The results of this study are twofold. First, the model is able to generate qualitatively
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similar responses to a monetary policy shock for nominal interest rate, output, employment,
unemployment, the real wage and inflation as in the case of a frictionless economy. However,
inflation and real wage are much less volatile once sticky prices assumption and staggered wage
setting are introduced to the model. Second, the model is able to explain some of the labor
market facts observed in the data. The model generates unemployment in equilibrium and
the model displays the Beveridge curve relationship. These results lead to the conclusion that
incorporating search and matching frictions and a bargaining framework into the baseline new
Keynesian model can generate a lower response for inflation and the real wage to a monetary
policy shock and can explain some of the labor market facts at the same time.
The next section discusses the details of the model and provides log-linearized version of
the relevant equations for deriving the impulse responses. The calibration of key parameters
of the model is discussed in the third section. The impulse responses of the key variables of
the model under alternative specifications are derived in the fourth. The last section concludes
the paper and gives some ideas for further research.
1.2 The Model
The model of this study has five agents: households, intermediate goods producers, retailers,
a final good producer and monetary policy authority. The households maximize their lifetime
utilities given their budget constraints. The main purpose of the distinction between the
intermediate goods producers and the retailers is the desire for distinguishing between labor
market frictions and price rigidities.8 The intermediate goods producers face labor market
frictions, namely search and matching frictions. Moreover, at any point in time only a fraction
of the intermediate firms are allowed to negotiate their wages. This fraction is assumed to
be exogenous to the model. The retailers operate in a monopolistically competitive market
and set their prices as in Calvo (1983). If there was only one type of firm, it would face the
labor market frictions in the decision process of employment and price rigidities while setting
the price of the retail good. This would make the model very complicated. The final good
8This type of modeling was first proposed by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999).
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producer buys all retail goods, combines them via a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator and produces the
final good. Finally, the monetary authority conducts the monetary policy by a simple Taylor
rule using the short-term nominal interest rate as the instrument.
1.2.1 The Household
The households are assumed to form a large extended family and distributed on a unit interval,
[0, 1]. At any point in time, some of the members of the family are employed while the rest
are unemployed. Because the income of an individual depends on her employment status,
her saving and consumption decisions depend on her employment history. Therefore, there
is heterogeneity in income and thus in consumption decisions of households. This creates
distributional problems. To avoid these problems, it is assumed that the family pools incomes
and then makes its consumption and saving decisions.9 In other words, each household is
perfectly insured by other households.10 The large extended family is simply referred as the
household.
The household chooses consumption, saving in the form of capital, and bond holdings at
each period. The household’s problem can be formalized as:
max Et
∞∑
t=0
βtlog(ct)
s.t. ct + kt+1 +
Bt
Ptrnt
= wtnt + (1− nt−1)b+ (zt + 1− δ)kt + Πt + Tt + Bt−1
Pt
(1.1)
ct, kt, and Bt are consumption of the final good, saving in terms of capital, and per-capita
holdings of a nominal one-period bond, respectively. The nominal return of a one-period bond
at time t is denoted by rnt . The household rents the capital she owns to the firms with a
rental rate zt. Pt is the aggregate price level, b stands for flow value of unemployment, and Tt
is total transfers from the government at time t. Thus, total income is sum of wage income
9This assumption is very common in the literature. See Merz (1995), Andolfatto (1996), den Haan, Ramey
and Watson (2000), Christoffel and Linzert (2005), Trigari (2006), Walsh (2005), and Gertler and Trigari (2009).
10The appendix of Andolfatto (1996) provides a simple institutional structure that implements the full-
insurance result.
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of employed individuals, unemployment benefits of not working households, total rent income
from capital remaining after depreciation, total payments of the firms to the laid-off workers in
the beginning of the period, the profits distributed by the firms, transfers from the government
and return from bonds that the household bought in the previous period.
Assuming that λt shows the marginal utility of consumption at date t and ωt is the Lagrange
multiplier, the first order conditions of the problem above can be written as:
ωt =
1
ct
(1.2)
λt = βEtλt+1
Pt
Pt+1
rnt (1.3)
λt = βEtλt+1[zt+1 + 1− δ] (1.4)
ct + kt+1 +
Bt
Ptrnt
= wtnt + (1− nt−1)b+ (zt + 1− δ)kt + Πt + Tt + Bt−1
Pt
(1.5)
The real interest rate is defined as 1 + rt = Et
Pt
Pt+1
rnt . With this definition the first order
conditions pin down to:
λt = βEtλt+1(1 + rt) and λt = βEtλt+1[zt+1 + 1− δ] (1.6)
Therefore, in the equilibrium the first order conditions yield rt = Et[zt+1 − δ].
1.2.2 Matching and production in intermediate market
In the labor market, search and matching model pioneered by Mortensen and Pissarides is
employed. The wages are set under Nash bargaining framework. The firms and workers meet
on a matching market where firms post vacancies and search for workers from an unemployment
pool and workers search for jobs. Therefore, the hiring process is time-consuming and costly
for both the firms and the workers. However, in this model it is assumed that the unemployed
workers passively search for jobs and do not bear any kind of cost from looking for job. The
firm pays the cost of searching for a worker by labor adjustment cost.
Within this model some firms create jobs, some others destroy jobs and some workers
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generate unemployment while looking for new jobs. This process is summarized by a single
matching function. In particular, the matching function is given by:
mt = σmu
σ
t v
1−σ
t (1.7)
where mt, ut and vt represent the matches within period t, the number of workers seeking for
a job and the number of vacancies posted at time t, respectively. σm is a scale factor that
measures the efficiency of the matching process and σ ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of the matching
with respect to unemployment. The matching function is increasing in both of its arguments
and it displays constant returns to scale. While an alternative assumption for the matching
function like increasing returns to scale might be interesting, Diamond (1981, 1982) states
that increasing returns can generate multiple equilibria. Moreover, the assumption of constant
returns provides a more tractable model.11
The sum of the vacancies posted in the economy at time t is given by vt =
∫ 1
0 vt(i)di.
Similarly, the level of employment is defined as the sum of the workforces of each intermediate
firm. Formally, it is given by nt =
∫ 1
0 nt(i)di. The unemployment level is determined by
the difference between the unity and the number of people working as of the end of the
previous period. Here, the distinction between unemployed worker and not in the labor force
worker is ignored. Blanchard and Diamond (1989) and Andolfatto (1996) support this idea
and the former study states that the flows from unemployed pool and not in the labor force
pool to employment are almost the same. For the reverse flows, Clark (1990) finds 0.02 for
transition from employment to unemployment and for transition from employment to non-
participation he finds 0.033. Like Cole and Rogerson (1999) it is reasonable to consider these
not in the labor force as unemployed people searching for jobs at a lower intensity. Therefore,
the unemployment level is defined as:
ut = 1− nt−1 (1.8)
11Blanchard and Diamond (1989) and Pissarides (1990) provide empirical evidence for the assumption of
constant returns to scale for the matching function.
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It is assumed that all workers in the unemployment pool look for a job and if a worker finds
a match, she starts working within that period immediately.
Let qt denote the probability an open vacancy is going to be matched with a searching
worker and st represent the probability a worker searching for a job is going to be matched
with an open vacancy. Then,
qt =
mt
vt
= σmθ
−σ
t and st =
mt
ut
= σmθ
1−σ
t (1.9)
where θt is the ratio of the number of open vacancies to the number of job-seeking workers,
vt
ut
.
In other words, θt measures the labor market tightness. Keeping the number of unemployed
people constant, an increase in the number of vacancies will result in a decrease in the proba-
bility of an open vacancy to be filled, qt, and an increase in the probability of an unemployed
worker to be matched with a job, st. This means that the tighter the labor market, the higher
the exit rate from unemployment, and the lower the probability that a vacant job will be filled.
The intermediate firms are distributed on the unit interval. They use labor and capital as
their inputs and sell their products to retailers. The production of the firm i is denoted by
yt(i) and the inputs used by this firm are expressed by kt(i) and nt(i).
In this model adjustment in employment occurs only in the extensive margin. The vari-
ations in the intensive margin are ignored for two reasons as mentioned in Sala, Soderstrom
and Trigari (2008). First, there are powerful findings in the literature that most of the cyclical
variations in the total work hours occur in the extensive margin. According to Hansen (1985)
more than sixty percent of the variation in the total work hours occurs in the extensive margin.
The second reason is the microeconomic evidence. The earlier estimates prove that the Frisch
elasticity is close to zero. For example MaCurdy (1981) finds that a ten percent increase in the
wage of a male worker causes a one to five percent change in his working hours. Altonji (1986)
uses a similar framework as in MaCurdy (1981) and reports that inter-temporal labor supply
elasticity is between 0 and 0.35. More recent studies including Ziliak and Kniesner (1999) and
French (2004) report comparable results with those earlier estimates. With the assumption of
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a Cobb-Douglas type production function, the output produced by firm i can be written as:
yt(i) = kt(i)
αnt(i)
1−α (1.10)
In the literature it is common to define the hiring rate of the intermediate firms, which is
given by the ratio of new hires of a firm to its existing workforce. The hiring rate of firm i is
denoted by xt(i) and defined as:
xt(i) =
qtvt(i)
nt−1(i)
(1.11)
At each period firm i separates from a fraction of its existing workforce. This fraction is
assumed to be exogenous and denoted by 1− ρ. Then, the workforce of the firm at time t will
be the sum of the surviving workers from previous period and new hires at current period.
Thus, the evolution of the workforce of firm i is:
nt(i) = ρnt−1(i) + qtvt(i) (1.12)
The value of firm i at time t is:
Ft(i) = p
w
t yt(i)− wt(i)nt(i)−
κ
2
xt(i)
2nt−1(i)− ztkt(i) + βEtΛt,t+1Ft+1(i) (1.13)
Here wt(i) stands for the ongoing wage rate at firm i and EtΛt,t+1 is the firm’s discount factor,
where Λt,t+1 =
λt+1
λt
. Finally, κ2xt(i)
2 gives the quadratic labor adjustment cost which is a
function of the firm’s hiring rate.
The firm takes the existing employment stock, probability of filling a vacancy, the rental
rate and current and expected path of the real wage as given and maximizes its value with
respect to vacancies and capital stock. If the firm is allowed to negotiate at that period, it
will bargain over the wage with its workforce. If it is not allowed, previous period’s wage
will prevail. Before discussing the details of wage determination process I elaborate on the
intermediate firm’s hiring and renting decisions.
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The firm chooses its employment level at time t by setting the hiring rate. The hiring
decision of the firm can be written as:
κxt(i) = p
w
t fnt(i)− wt(i) + β
κ
2
EtΛt,t+1xt+1(i)
2 + ρβκEtΛt,t+1xt+1(i) (1.14)
The capital decision is straightforward to derive:
zt = αp
w
t
yt(i)
kt(i)
(1.15)
It is assumed that the capital market is perfectly competitive and capital is perfectly mobile.
Due to these assumptions the output/capital ratios are equal across the firms. Therefore,
yt(i)
kt(i)
= ytkt .
Finally, the value of adding another worker to the labor force for the firm i is:
∂Ft(i)
∂nt(i)
= Jt(i) = p
w
t fnt(i)− wt(i)− β
κ
2
EtΛt,t+1xt+1(i)
2 + βEtΛt,t+1
nt+1
nt
(i)Jt(i) (1.16)
Equation 1.16 can also be rewritten by using the fact that nt+1(i) = ρnt(i) + xt+1(i)nt(i) as:
Jt(i) = p
w
t fnt(i)− wt(i) + β
κ
2
EtΛt,t+1xt+1(i)
2 + ρβEtΛt,t+1Jt(i) (1.17)
After defining the decision process of the firms, the values of being employed at firm i
and being unemployed to a worker are derived. These values are denoted by Vt(i) and Ut,
respectively. The value of being employed differs across the workers because the wage is
different at each firm. The value of being employed at firm i is:
Vt(i) = wt(i) + βEtΛt,t+1[ρVt+1(i) + (1− ρ)Ut+1] (1.18)
It is the sum of the wage that the worker is receiving from the firm at time t and discounted
value of expected return at time t+ 1. In the next period, the worker will survive at the same
firm with probability ρ or will be separated with probability 1− ρ.
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While deriving the value of being unemployed to a worker first the average value of em-
ployment, Vx,t, to the new workers is defined. In particular,
Vx,t =
∫ 1
0
Vt(i)
xt(i)nt−1(i)
xtnt−1
di (1.19)
The equation 1.19 can be rearranged such that Vx,t =
1
vt−1
∫ 1
0 Vt(i)vt−1(i)di. In other words,
the average value of being employed is the average value of all vacancies to the worker. The
value of being unemployed on the other hand is the sum of the unemployment benefits received
at that period and expected discounted value of the next period’s income. In the next period,
an unemployed worker will find a successful match with an open vacancy with probability st+1
or will be unemployed again with probability 1−st+1. Formally, the value of being unemployed
to a worker can be expressed as:
Ut = b+ βEtΛt,t+1[st+1Vx,t+1 + (1− st+1)Ut+1] (1.20)
The wage setting process is a Poisson process as in Calvo-type price setting. At any period
each intermediate firm re-negotiates its wage with its existing workforce with probability 1−ϕw.
In other words, average duration of the wage at a firm is 11−ϕw . Moreover, the probability a firm
can re-negotiate its wage is independent from its negotiation history. Once an intermediate
firm is allowed to bargain with its existing workforce, they negotiate through Nash bargaining.
This process is summarized by:
max Ht(r)
ηJt(r)
1−η (1.21)
where Jt(r) denotes the value of adding another worker to the bargaining firm and Ht(r) stands
for the surplus of an average negotiating worker. To distinguish between the negotiating and
not-negotiating firms, the former ones are indexed with r.
Let w∗t stand for the wage of a firm that is allowed to re-negotiate. The bargained wage is
the same among all bargaining firms due to the constant returns because all firms and workers
face with the same problem. All workers are identical at the margin and the firm bargains
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with the marginal worker. To be specific, the surplus of a worker working at firm i is:
Ht(i) = Vt(i)− Ut (1.22)
and the average surplus of a worker hired at time t is:
Hx,t = Vx,t − Ut (1.23)
Plugging the equations 1.18 and 1.20 into equation 1.23 and rearranging it results in
Ht(i) = wt(i)− b+ βEtΛt,t+1[ρHt+1(i)− st+1Hx,t+1] (1.24)
Due to the assumption of a Poisson process in wage determination, both the workers and firms
do not know the exact time of next negotiation. Therefore, both parties have to take the
future path of wage into consideration. Before expressing the surpluses of the firm and worker,
corresponding cumulative discount factors have to be defined. The firm’s cumulative discount
factor, Σt(r), depends on the future employment size of the firm and expected duration of the
contract. The worker’s cumulative discount factor, ∆t, depends on the probability the worker
will survive in the job and expected duration of the contract. These factors are defined as:
Σt(r) = Et
∞∑
s=0
nt+s
nt
(r)(βϕw)
sΛt,t+s (1.25)
∆t = Et
∞∑
s=0
(ρβϕw)
sΛt,t+s (1.26)
There is only one difference between these two discount factors. The firm’s discount factor
depends on the expected employment size of the firm, nt+snt (r), while the worker’s discount
factor depends on the probability the worker will survive, ρs. The rest of the terms in the
discount factors is identical. On average, expected employment size exceeds the probability
a worker will be unemployed in the future. Therefore, the worker places less weight on the
future than does the firm. The worker just considers her wage in that firm but the firm has
to consider its employment size in the present time and in the future. Having defined the
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discount factors, the sum of the expected wage revenue of a bargaining worker, Wwt (r), and
expected wage payment of a firm, W ft (r), can be expressed as:
12
Wwt (r) = ∆tw
∗
t + (1− ϕw)Et
∞∑
s=1
(ρβ)sΛt,t+s∆t+sw
∗
t+s (1.27)
W ft (r) = Σtw
∗
t + (1− ϕw)Et
∞∑
s=1
nt+s
t
(r)βsΛt,t+sΣt+s(r)w
∗
t+s (1.28)
As the appendix proves, the surpluses of the bargaining worker and firm can be deduced to:
Ht(r) = W
w
t (r)− Et
∞∑
s=1
(ρβ)sΛt,t+s[b+ βst+sΛt+s,t+s+1Hx,t+s+1] (1.29)
Jt(r) = Et
∞∑
s=1
(ρβ)sΛt,t+s[p
w
t+sfnt+s + βΛt+s,t+s+1
κ
2
x2t+s+1(r)]−W ft (r) (1.30)
Then, the solution to the Nash bargaining problem is:
η∆tJt(r) = (1− η)Σt(r)Ht(r) (1.31)
Rearranging this solution results in:
χtJt(r) = (1− χt(r))Ht(r) (1.32)
with χt(r) =
η
η+(1−η) Σt(r)
∆t
, which denotes the relative weight in the sharing rule. There is
only one difference between the solution to the Nash bargaining in this model and a period-
by-period Nash bargaining solution. This difference is named as horizon effect by Gertler
and Trigari (2009). If the firms are allowed to bargain every period, the Nash bargaining
solution will depend only on the bargaining power of the worker. It will be the case that
ηJt(r) = (1 − η)Ht(r). However, in this model the sharing rule depends on the worker’s
bargaining power and the ratio of the firm’s and worker’s cumulative discount factors. As
discussed above, during the bargaining process the worker cares only about her position at the
12The appendix provides the details of the derivations.
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firm where the firm considers its existing workforce as well as its future employment size. This
results in, on average, Σt(r)∆t . Therefore, χt(r) < η. This means that the bargaining power of
the firm in this model is higher than that in the conventional model due to the horizon effect.
The bargained wage can be driven by plugging the value of hiring another worker to the
firm and value of being employed to a worker into the bargaining problem.
∆tw
∗
t = w
o
t (r) + ρβϕwEtΛt,t+1∆t+1w
∗
t+1 (1.33)
where wot (r) stands for the target wage and defined as:
wot (r) = χt(r)[p
w
t fnt + β
κ
2
EtΛt,t+1x
2
t+1(r)] + (1− χt(r))[b+ βst+1EtΛt,t+1Hx,t+1]
The target wage is a convex combination of the contribution of a worker to the match and his
foregone benefits from being unemployed. Iterating equation 1.33 renders in
w∗t = Et
∞∑
s=0
φt,t+sw
o
t+s(r) (1.34)
where
φt,t+s =
(ρβϕw)
sΛt,t+s
Et
∑∞
s=0(ρβϕw)
sΛt,t+s
(1.35)
In the limit case, ϕw = 0, the bargained wage converges to the target wage, which is the case
in period-by-period bargaining solution.
The average wage across all workers in the economy can be written as:
wt =
∫ 1
0
wt(i)
nt(i)
nt
di (1.36)
It is already assumed that a certain fraction of the firms can re-negotiate and rest of the firms
accept the previous period’s wage. Then equation 1.36 can be written as:
wt = (1− ϕw)w∗t + ϕw
∫ 1
0
wt−1(i)
nt(i)
nt
di (1.37)
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1.2.3 Retailers and final goods market
This section presents price setting in the retail goods market, where Rotemberg and Woodford
(1997) is followed. There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers distributed
on a unit interval. They buy intermediate goods, differentiate them with a technology that
transforms one unit of intermediate good to one unit of retail good at no cost, and resell
them to the final good producer. Final good producer collects these goods and combines
them via a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator. The profit generated in the retail market is assumed to
be distributed to the households, who are the ultimate owners of the firms. The monopoly
powers of the retailers provide the nominal price rigidity in the economy. It is assumed that
the marginal cost of each retailer is the relative price of each intermediate good. The aggregate
output, yt, can be described in terms of each retailer’s output, yjt, and the firm’s own price
elasticity of substitution across differentiated retail goods, ε. Formally,
yt =
[∫ 1
0
y
ε−1
ε
jt
] ε
ε−1
(1.38)
The aggregate price index can be defined as the aggregate of the nominal sale price of each
retailer:
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
P 1−εjt
] 1
1−ε
(1.39)
The demand curve for good j then is determined by relative price of the good and the aggregate
demand. This demand curve is given by:
yjt =
[
Pjt
Pt
]−ε
yt (1.40)
In the price setting a Calvo-type framework is employed. In any given period, with a probability
1−ϕp, each retailer is able to reset its price while the remaining firms are not allowed to change
their prices. The probability does not depend on the elapsed time between two adjustment
dates. Therefore, assuming that P ∗t is the optimal price for the firms that are able to reset
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their prices, the price index can be written as:
Pt =
[
(1− ϕp)(P ∗t )1−ε + ϕp(Pt−1)1−ε
] 1
1−ε (1.41)
where the optimal price is the solution to the profit-maximization problem of the firm. The
firm sets its price for the expected number of periods that it will not be able to reset its price.
The profit maximization problem of the firm can be written as:
max Et
∞∑
s=0
(βϕp)
s
[
P ∗jt
Pt
− pwt+s
]−ε
yjt+s (1.42)
subject to the demand for that good. The optimal price level for the firm that is able to change
its price is:
p∗jt =
ε
ε− 1Et
∑∞
s=0(βϕp)
sP εt+sp
w
t+syt+s∑∞
s=0(βϕp)
sP ε−1t+s yt+s
(1.43)
1.2.4 Monetary athority
The studies that analyze the effects of monetary policy shocks in a new Keynesian framework
generally define the monetary policy by a rule for setting the nominal interest rate. This policy
rule has either been derived from a specification of the monetary authority’s objective function
or specified as an arbitrary instrument rule, e.g. Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993).13 The researchers
that derive the rule from a specification of an objective function generally choose to minimize
a quadratic loss function that depends on inflation and output gap. Another way to derive the
objective function is to derive the policy rule by determining the quadratic loss function from
a welfare criterion that is obtained as a log-linear approximation of the utility function.14 In
this study, for simplicity, it is assumed that monetary policymaker uses short-term nominal
interest rate as the policy instrument and employs a Taylor-type rule to conduct monetary
13For some examples see Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), Woodford (1999, 2001), McCallum and Nelson
(1999), Svensson and Woodford (2003).
14For a detailed analysis of the link between welfare criterion and the typesof quadratic loss functions, see
Woodford (2001a).
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policy. Defining monetary policy via minimizing a quadratic loss function or deriving it from
a welfare criterion is left to further research. The gross nominal interest rate is determined by:
rnt = β
−(1−ρm)(rnt−1)
ρmEt(pit+1)
γpi(1−ρm)(yzt )
γy(1−ρm)eε
m
t (1.44)
where the degree of interest rate smoothing is captured by the parameter ρm and the output
gap is denoted by yzt . The response coefficients of expected inflation and output gap are
represented by γpi and γy, respectively. The last term on the right hand side is an i.i.d.
monetary policy shock.
To complete the model, the economy-wide resource constraint is imposed.
yt = ct + kt+1 − (1− δ)kt + κ
2
x2tnt (1.45)
This condition implies that the total output produced at time t, yt, must be equal to the sum
of the consumption of the household, ct, investment made on capital, kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt, and
aggregate labor adjustment costs of the intermediate firms, κ2x
2
tnt.
1.2.5 Log-linearizing the model
The model is log-linearized around a zero inflation steady-state. As a general note, the variables
with a hat denotes the percentage deviations from their steady state values and the variables
without a hat and without a time subscript denote the steady state values of the regarding
variables. First, the wage and hiring equations are log-linearized. The percentage deviation of
the target wage from its steady state is:
wˆot (r) = χp
wfnw
−1
(
pˆwt + fˆnt
)
+ χw−1
[
pwfn + β
κ
2
x2 − b− sβχκx
1− χ
]
χˆt(r) +
χβ
κ
2
x2w−1EtΛˆt,t+1 + χβκx2w−1Etxˆt+1(r) + sβχκxw−1Et
(
sˆt+1 + Hˆt+1 + Λˆt,t+1
)
(1.46)
According to equation 1.46 the variations in the target wage is the sum of the variations in
the marginal contribution of a worker to the bargaining firm and foregone benefits of a worker
from unemployment. In addition to these, the target wage is also affected by the horizon
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effect. The horizon effect influences the variations in the target wage in two ways. The first
one stems from the steady state value of relative bargaining power, χ. In the case of period-
by-period Nash bargaining the steady state value of the relative bargaining power equals the
actual bargaining power, η. When the multi-period wage contracts are introduced, χ will be
less than η.15 In other words, the impacts of the factors determining the variations in the
target wage are lessened by the introduction of multi-period wage bargaining. The second
channel is the deviations in the relative bargaining power, which is captured by χˆt(r). Since
the relative bargaining power of the worker depends on the discount factors of the bargaining
firm and worker, the movements in these discount factors will impact the target wage too. The
percentage deviations of bargaining weight, discount factors of the bargaining firm and worker
from their steady state values are:
χˆt(r) = −(1− χ)
(
Σˆt(r)−∆t
)
(1.47)
Σˆt(r) = (1− ρ)βϕwEtxˆt+1(r) + βϕwEt
[
Λˆt,t+1 + Σˆt+1(r)
]
(1.48)
∆ˆt = ρβϕwEt
(
Λˆt,t+1 + ∆ˆt+1
)
(1.49)
According to these equations, the bargaining weight responds to any variation in the discount
factors of both worker and firm. It is also obvious that when the flexible wages areallowed
by setting ϕw = 0, it will be the case that χt(r) = η. This implies that the variations in the
target wage will occur only due to the reasons creating variations in conventional bargaining
model. In other words, the horizon effect will be ineffective.
As the appendix proves, equation 1.46 can be simplified to:
wˆot (r) = wˆ
o
t +
τ1
1− ρβϕwEt
(
wˆt+1 − wˆ∗t+1
)
+
τ2
1− ρβϕw (wˆt − wˆ
∗
t ) (1.50)
15Under the calibration presented in the next section at the steady state χ = 0.44 when η = 0.5
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where
wˆot = ϕfn
(
pˆwt + fˆnt
)
+ ϕχχˆt + ϕs(1− χ)−1Etχˆt+1
+(ϕx + ϕs)Etxˆt+1 +
(ϕx
2
+ ϕs
)
EtΛˆt,t+1 + ϕsEtsˆt+1 (1.51)
with τ1 = ϕsΓ(1 − ρβϕw) and τ2[ϕxϕw − ϕχ(1 − χ)(1 − ρ)Ψ]Σw(1 − ρβϕw). wˆot stands for
the deviations in the spillover-free target wage. There are two spillover effects in this model:
direct spillover effects and indirect spillover effects. The significance of these effects for the
target wage is captured by τ1 and τ2, respectively. The direct spillover effect stems from the
difference between the expected average market wage and the expected contract wage. If, for
example, the expected average market wage exceeds the expected contract wage, workers will
move into employment in the next period. In the other case, the workers will wait for another
period and try to find a job. Therefore, there is an impact of the expected average market
wage on the wage bargaining process. The hiring rate of the bargaining firm is the source of
the indirect spillover effects. The appendix proves that the deviations in the hiring rate of a
bargaining firm depends on the difference between the deviations in the average market wage
and the contract wage. This relationship is summarized by:
xˆt(r) = xˆt + wΣ(wˆt − wˆ∗t ) (1.52)
The hiring rate influences the target wage through the bargaining firm’s savings in adjustments
costs and the bargaining weight. Finally, the percentage deviations of the contract wage and
the wage index from their steady state levels are:
wˆ∗t = (1− ρβϕw)wˆot (r) + ρβϕwEtwˆ∗t+1 (1.53)
wˆt = (1− ϕw)wˆ∗t + ϕwwˆt−1 (1.54)
After log-linearizing the target wage, log-linearized versions of the rest of the equations in the
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model are presented as follows. The hiring rate of the firm is
xˆt = p
wfn
(
pˆwt + fˆnt
)
− wwˆt + βEtxˆt+1 + β
2
(1 + ρ)EtΛˆt,t+1 (1.55)
Furthermore, aggregating and log-linearizing the vacancies around its steady state results in
xˆt = qˆt + vˆt − nˆt (1.56)
The percentage deviations of production function, marginal product of labor and capital rental
rate from their steady state levels are the same across the firms. Therefore,
yˆt = αkˆt + (1− α)nˆt (1.57)
fˆnt = yˆt − nˆt (1.58)
zˆt = pˆ
w
t + yˆt − kˆt (1.59)
The equations that build the matching process; matching function, transition probabilities and
employment and unemployment dynamics are:
mˆt = σuˆt + (1− σ)vˆt (1.60)
qˆt = mˆt − vˆt (1.61)
sˆt = mˆt − uˆt (1.62)
nˆt = ρnˆt−1 + (1− ρ)mˆt (1.63)
uˆt = −n
u
nˆt (1.64)
The Euler equation of the model, the second of the first order conditions and the marginal
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utility of consumption can be written as:
λˆt = Et[λˆt+1 + rˆt] (1.65)
λˆt = Etλˆt+1 + βzEtzˆt+1 (1.66)
λˆt = −cˆt (1.67)
The real interest rate equation, rnt =
Pt+1
Pt
(1 + rt), therefore;
rˆnt = Etpˆit+1 + (1− β)rˆt (1.68)
The model produces a forward-looking Phillips curve relationship:
pˆit = θpˆ
w
t + βEtpˆit+1 (1.69)
where θ =
(1−ϕp)(1−βϕp)
ϕp
. Finally, the nominal interest rate rule and the resource constraint
are:
rˆnt = ρmrˆ
n
t−1 + (1− ρm)γpiEtpˆit+1 + (1− ρm)γyEtyˆt+1 + εmt (1.70)
yˆt =
c
y
cˆt + δ
k
y
[
kˆt+1 − (1− δ)kˆt
]
+
κx2n
2y
[2xˆt + nˆt] (1.71)
1.3 Model calibration
The length of the period is taken as a quarter and the time discount factor, β, is set to
0.99. This yields approximately a four percent annual rate of interest at the steady state.
Following Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2008) and
Sala, Soderstrom and Trigari (2008), the capital depreciation rate, δ, is calibrated as 0.025.
This results in a ten percent annual rate of depreciation in capital. In the studies cited above
the steady state share of capital income, α, ranges from 0.3 and 0.36. Erceg, Henderson and
Levin (2005) and Walsh (2005) also report values in the same range. In this study the middle
point is chosen and α is set to 0.33.
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For the exogenous job separation rate, 1−ρ, Davis, Haltiwanger and Shuh (1996) and Hall
(1995) find values between 0.08 and 0.1. Gertler and Trigari (2009) use the fact that an average
job lasts for about two and a half years. This fact results in an exogenous job separation rate
of 0.035 for monthly data. Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2008) and Sala, Soderstrom and Trigari
(2008) follow the same path and set ρ to 0.895, which is consistent with Shimer (2005). Since
the framework employed here is similar to the latter studies, job separation rate is set to 0.105.
In the literature, there is not a consensus for the value of elasticity of matches to unemploy-
ment, σ. There is a wide range of values used in the literature (0.4 to 0.72).16 This parameter
is not a very critical one for the results of this paper; therefore, following the majority of the
studies σ is set to 0.5.
To calibrate the coefficient of the labor adjustment cost, κ, the steady state value of the
probability that an unemployed worker finds a job or shortly job finding rate, s, has to be
calibrated. The values used in the literature varies from 0.6 to 0.95.17 To be able to compare
the model in this study with the studies that use a similar framework s is set to 0.95. The
bargaining power of the workers, η is set to 0.5. This leads to an equally shared surplus
between the bargaining worker and the bargaining firm. The frequency of wage renegotiation,
ϕw, is calibrated to 0.718. This implies that an average firm can re-negotiate its wage once in
every three and a half quarters.
The parameter b¯ is interpreted differently in the literature. Shimer (2005) thinks that
this is unemployment insurance and estimates it as 0.4. Hall (2005) interprets more broadly
and treats it as the sum of the unemployment benefits and utility from leisure. He sets it
to 0.7. Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2008) and Sala, Soderstrom and Trigari (2008) estimate
this parameter as 0.72. In this study a value within this range is chosen for b¯, 0.5. Finally,
the efficiency parameter in matching function, σm is calibrated as 0.92 to match the average
duration of a vacancy. With this calibration the probability a vacancy will be filled is 0.9. The
duration of an average vacancy is reported to be under one month by Blanchard and Diamond
16Blanchard and Diamond (1989) and Shimer (2005) set the lowest and highest value, respectively.
17Walsh (2005) uses 0.2, actually he uses 0.6 for quarterly data under which the average duration of unem-
ployment is 1.67 quarters.
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(1989), which requires q to be 1. However, the distinction between the removal time of the
advertisement and actual date that the vacancy is filled was pointed out by van Ours and
Ridder (1992). They report that in the first two weeks after the vacancy is posted, seventy five
percent of the vacancies are filled, however, it takes on the average forty five days to choose
the best applicant from the pool.
Calibration of parameters in the final goods market starts with setting the probability a firm
cannot change its price, ϕp. Gali and Gertler (1999) and Sbordone (2002) set ϕp = 0.85, which
implies that only 15 percent of all firms adjust their prices optimally each period. However,
Bils and Klenow (2002) provides empirical evidence that the prices are fixed on average for two
quarters. This implies ϕp = 0.5. In the mean time Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005)
sets it to 0.6. Therefore, setting ϕp = 0.6 is consistent with the literature and closed to the
empirical findings. This implies that an average retailer will keep its price unchanged for 2.5
quarters. Moreover, assuming ε = 10, which is suggested by Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2008)
and Sala, Soderstrom and Trigari (2008), results in an approximately 11 percent markup of
prices on marginal costs.
Finally the parameters in the nominal interest rate rule are calibrated by following Clarida,
Gali and Gertler (2000). Interest rate smoothing parameter, ρm, is set to 0.9, and the response
coefficients in the Taylor rule are calibrated as γp = 1.5 and γy = 0.5. Table 1.1 collects the
descriptions and values of important parameters of the model.
1.4 Alternative specifications and impulse responses to a mon-
etary policy shock
Three alternative cases are considered and the impulse responses of the key macroeconomic
variables under these specifications are derived. The first case is a frictionless economy. It is
assumed that the prices and wages are fully flexible. Then, in the second case sticky prices
assumption to the first case is introduced and impulse responses with those in the first case are
compared. Finally, sticky wages assumption is introduced and the impacts of this assumption
on the impulse responses are observed. In the last case, two subcases are considered and
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impulse responses in the cases of first without spillover effects and second with spillover effects
are derived. In the frictionless case, the model consists of the following equations.
Case 1: Frictionless Economy (ϕp = 0 and ϕw = 0)
λˆt = −cˆt (1.72)
rˆnt = Etpˆit+1 + (1− β)rˆt (1.73)
λˆt = Etλˆt+1 + βzEtzˆt+1 (1.74)
mˆt = σuˆt + (1− σ)vˆt (1.75)
uˆt = −n
u
nˆt (1.76)
qˆt = mˆt − vˆt (1.77)
sˆt = mˆt − uˆt (1.78)
xˆt = qˆt + vˆt − nˆt (1.79)
nˆt = ρnˆt−1 + (1− ρ)mˆt (1.80)
yˆt = αkˆt + (1− α)nˆt (1.81)
zˆt = pˆ
w
t + yˆt − kˆt (1.82)
fˆnt = yˆt − nˆt (1.83)
EtΛˆt,t+1 = Etλˆt+1 − λˆt (1.84)
xˆt = p
wfn
(
pˆwt + fˆnt
)
− wwˆt + βEtxˆt+1 + β
2
(1 + ρ)EtΛˆt,t+1 (1.85)
wˆ∗t = wˆ
o
t (r) = wˆt, Σˆt = ∆ˆt = χˆt = 0, Jˆt = xˆt = Hˆt (1.86)
wˆt =
ηpwfn
w
(
pˆwt + fˆnt
)
+
ηβκx2 + 2ηβκxs
2w
EtΛˆt,t+1 +
ηβκxs
w
Etsˆt+1 +
ηβκx(x+ s)
w
Etxˆt+1 (1.87)
yˆt =
c
y
cˆt + δ
k
y
[
kˆt+1 − (1− δ)kˆt
]
+
κx2n
2y
[2xˆt + nˆt] (1.88)
rˆnt = ρmrˆ
n
t−1 + (1− ρm)γpiEtpˆit+1 + (1− ρm)γyEtyˆt+1 + εmt (1.89)
pˆit = pˆ
w
t (1.90)
The equations from 1.72 to 1.85, 1.88 and 1.89 are shared by all cases. In the frictionless case,
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the target wage and aggregate wage are the same as stated in equation 1.86. Moreover, the
discount factors are constant and equal to one at all times. The effective bargaining power
is equal to the actual bargaining power. Then, in this case the aggregate wage is a convex
combination of the worker’s contribution to the firm’s revenues once she is added to the labor
force of the firm and the unemployment benefits that she loses once she accepts a job with
a firm. Since the effective bargaining power, χt, is constant over time, the horizon effect is
not present. The last equation shows the relationship between inflation and marginal cost.
Since the final goods producers are allowed to change their prices every period, the percentage
change in inflation is governed only by the percentage change in the marginal cost.
Figure 1.1 plots the responses of inflation, output, consumption, employment, unemploy-
ment, vacancies and the real wage to a one standard deviation increase in the nominal interest
rate under the case of no rigidities. An increase in the nominal interest rate causes a decrease
in consumption through the optimality condition of the household presented in equation 1.3.
This decrease in consumption results in a decrease in output, employment and vacancies in the
economy. The decrease in employment renders in an increase in unemployment. The hiring
rate decreases as a result of the decrease in vacancies. Then, the wage rate and the marginal
cost decrease. Since the firms are allowed to adjust their prices every period, the percentage
deviation of inflation from its steady state level is only determined by the percentage deviation
of the marginal cost. Therefore, the aggregate price level adjusts immediately and inflation
decreases when the shock hits the economy. All of the variables except unemployment respond
to the shock contemporaneously. The unemployment responds with a one quarter delay due
to the timing assumption in employment. Since there is a high degree of autocorrelation in
the nominal interest rate, the shock dies out very slowly in the real economy. Output and
consumption slowly return to their original levels. In the labor market the impacts of the
shock last for almost three years. However, inflation returns back to the steady state very
soon.
The case that has the sticky prices assumption is labeled as the case 2. Under this case
the equations 1.72 to 1.89 of the case 1 will be the same. The only impact of the introduction
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of this assumption is the replacement of equation 1.90 with the following one.18
pˆit = θpˆ
w
t + βEtpˆit+1 (1.91)
This assumption does not influence the equations for the wage bargaining process. Equation
1.91 states that, when the prices are sticky, variations in inflation depends not only on the
variations in marginal cost but also on the variations in the expected inflation for the next
period.
Figure 1.2 shows the impulse responses of inflation, output, consumption, employment,
unemployment, vacancies and the real wage to a one standard deviation increase in the nominal
interest rate under the assumption of sticky prices. Compared to the first case the response
of inflation is much lower in the second case. However, the sticky price assumption does not
have an impact on the responses of the other variables. In other words, the real side of the
economy is not influenced by that assumption in terms of responses to a monetary policy shock.
An increase in the nominal interest rate causes an increase in the real interest rate because
a big fraction of the firms are not allowed to adjust their prices. One explanation for these
variables not responding more than they do in the first case is the flexible wage assumption.
The impact of the change in nominal interest rate, therefore, real interest rate is fully taken
by the real wage and thus by marginal cost. It can be concluded that adding the Calvo-type
price stickiness to the model only results in a lower response in inflation.
In the case 3, the sticky wages assumption is incorporated into the previous case. As
mentioned above two subcases will be considered. To identify the impacts of spillover effects
first the economy when the spillover effects are not present is considered and the impulse
responses are derived. Then the spillover effects are included and the influences of these
effects on the impulse responses of the variables are identified. The relevant equations for the
18To save space the equations that are the same as in case 1 are not replicated.
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third case will be the equations 1.72 to 1.85 and the equations below.
χˆt = −(1− χ)(Σˆt − ∆ˆt) (1.92)
Σˆt = (1− ρ)βϕwEtxˆt+1 + βϕwEt
[
Λˆt,t+1 + Σˆt+1
]
(1.93)
∆ˆt = ρβϕwEt
[
Λˆt,t+1 + ∆ˆt+1
]
(1.94)
∆ˆt + wˆ
∗
t = (1− ρβϕw)wˆot (r) + ρβϕwEt
[
Λˆt,t+1 + Σˆt+1 + wˆ
∗
t+1
]
(1.95)
pˆit =
(1− βϕp)(1− ϕp)
ϕp
pˆwt + βEtpˆit+1 (1.96)
wˆt = (1− ϕw)wˆ∗t + ϕwwˆt−1 (1.97)
wˆot (r) = ϕfn
(
pˆwt + fˆnt
)
+ ϕχχˆt + ϕxEtxˆt+1 +
(ϕx
2
+ ϕs
)
EtΛˆt,t+1
+ϕsEt
[
sˆt+1 + xˆt+1 +
1
1− χχˆt+1
]
(1.98)
wˆot (r) = ϕfn
(
pˆwt + fˆnt
)
+ ϕχχˆt + ϕs(1− χ)−1χˆt+1 +
(ϕx + ϕs)Etxˆt+1 +
(ϕx
2
+ ϕs
)
EtΛˆt,t+1 + ϕsEtsˆt+1 +
[ϕxϕw − ϕχ(1− χ)xΨ] Σw (wˆt − wˆ∗t ) + ϕsΓEt
(
wˆt+1 − wˆ∗t+1
)
(1.99)
yˆt =
c
y
cˆt + δ
k
y
[
kˆt+1 − (1− δ)kˆt
]
+
κx2n
2y
[2xˆt + nˆt] (1.100)
rˆnt = ρmrˆ
n
t−1 + (1− ρmγpi)Etpˆit+1 + (1− ρmγy)Etyˆt + εmt (1.101)
The spillover effects impact the model through the target wage equation. Target wage equation
for the subcase when spillover effects are not in effect is given by equation 1.98 and for the
other subcase it is given by equation 1.99.
When the assumption that at any period only a fraction of the firms are allowed to bargain
their wages with their workforces is introduced to the model, the effective bargaining power,
χt, will not be equal to the actual bargaining power, η, anymore. As stated by equation 1.92,
in the case of sticky wages the variations in the effective bargaining power depends on the
variations in the discount factors of the bargaining firm and worker too. These variations are
denoted by Σˆt and ∆ˆt, respectively. This also introduces the horizon effect to the model as
discussed in the previous section. Since at the steady state χ < η, the variations in the effective
bargaining power of the worker is lessened due to the horizon effect.
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Figure 1.3 depicts the impulse responses of inflation, output, consumption, employment,
unemployment, vacancies and the real wage to a one standard deviation increase in the nominal
interest rate when the spillover effects are not present. The first impact of the sticky wages
assumption is the drastic decrease in the response of real wage to the monetary policy shock.
Since the prices are sticky, the increase in the nominal interest rate causes an increase in the
real interest rate. This results in a decrease in the output and employment. The monetary
transmission mechanism discussed in the second case is still in effect. However, in the third
case the shock to the nominal interest rate is not fully taken by the real wage and marginal
cost. Since the wages are sticky, the responses of output, employment, unemployment and
vacancies, in absolute values, are higher compared to the previous case. Finally, it is worth to
mention that the real wage slowly returns back to its steady state.
Figure 1.4 presents the impulse responses of the same variables in Figure B.3 in the case of
sticky prices and sticky wages with spillover effects. The first impact of these spillover effects
is that the response of real wage to the change in nominal interest rate is higher when these
effects are in present. The reason for this higher volatility in the real wage is due to the higher
volatility of the bargained wage compared to the aggregate wage. Not reported here but the
impulse response of the bargained wage is much higher than that of the aggregate wage. This
finding is in the same line with Haefke, Sonntag and Rens (2008).
Finally, the model is able to generate a negative relationship between unemployment and
vacancies, so called Beveridge curve relationship, under all specifications.
1.5 Conclusion
Through the last decades the new Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models
have been used to explain the relationships among money, inflation, and business cycles. How-
ever, some studies showed that incorporating imperfect competition and price rigidities into
an individually optimizing framework do not replicate the responses of output and inflation to
monetary policy shocks as they are empirically observed in the data. Moreover, in these models
29
unemployment in equilibrium is ruled out by a perfectly competitive labor market assump-
tion. These shortcomings triggered other lines of research. Researchers focused on alternative
specifications such as including structural inflation inertia, adding habit persistence, assum-
ing variable capital utilization, including sticky wages along with other labor market frictions.
Prominent studies in the literature showed that labor market frictions improve the understand-
ing of business cycle fluctuations and effects of monetary policy shocks. It is claimed that by
concentrating on the labor market frictions, it might be possible to simultaneously generate
desired responses of inflation and output to monetary policy shocks found in the data while
capturing the labor market dynamics.
The main purpose of this chapter is to build a tractable model that is able to capture the
labor market facts and to generate desired responses of inflation and output to a monetary pol-
icy shock simultaneously. To be able to do that search-theoretic models are chosen due to their
strengths mentioned in the literature. Among a lot of alternatives, the model built in Gertler
and Trigari (2009) is employed and a monetary policy and nominal price rigidities are intro-
duced to that model. To evaluate the model the impulse responses of the key macroeconomic
variables to a monetary policy shock under alternative specifications are derived.
The results are as follows. The impulse responses of the variables in the case of sticky
prices and sticky wages follow the same pattern as they do in a frictionless economy. However,
the responses of inflation and real wage are much less volatile. Sticky prices assumption
does not influence the variables other than inflation in terms of responses to a monetary
policy shock. The introduction of sticky wages assumption causes a higher response in output,
employment, unemployment and vacancies in absolute value. Staggered wage contracts bring
two spillover effects and their impacts on the impulse responses to a monetary policy shock
are also identified. The real wage is more volatile when these effects are in present because the
bargained wage is more volatile than the market wage. Finally, the model is able to generate
the Beveridge curve relationship. The case with both sticky prices assumption and sticky
wages assumption is able to explain some of the business cycle facts can generate some of
the labor market facts simultaneously. Therefore, it can be concluded that it is possible to
build a tractable model that explains some of the labor market facts and generate some of
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the desired responses to a monetary policy shock. This can be done by incorporating labor
market frictions in the form of Mortensen-Pissarides framework and staggered wage contracts
to a new Keynesian framework.
For further research the model built in this chapter can be extended in several ways. First,
since the model is able to explain the business cycle facts and some of the labor market facts
simultaneously, it can be used to investigate the influences of the labor market institutions on
the responses of macroeconomic variables to macroeconomic disturbances. Second, one can
try to improve the empirical performance of the model by capturing the facts that it cannot
explain. A couple of these facts are the hump-shaped pattern of the response of output to a
monetary policy shock and persistence in the response of inflation.
In the second chapter, I follow the first possible extension and analyze the impacts of
labor market institutions on business cycles. The model in that chapter uses a very similar
framework to the one built in this chapter with sticky prices and and sticky wages assumptions.
It extends the model of the third case with endogenous separations and includes severance
payments that is made to the involuntarily separated workers. With the severance payments
insitution, there are three institutions considered in that chapter. The other two institutions
are unemployment benefits and worker’s bargaining power, which are already present in the
baseline framwework. It derives the impulse responses of key macroeconomic variables to
macroeconomic disturbances under alternative parameterizations of these institutions.
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Table 1.1: Parameter Values
Parameter Description Value
β discount factor 0.99
δ capital depreciation rate 0.025
α share of capital income 0.33
1− ρ job separation rate 0.105
σ elasticity of matches to unemployment 0.5
s job finding rate at steady-state 0.95
η bargaining power 0.5
b¯ unemployment insurance 0.5
ϕp infrequency of price setting 0.6
ε elasticity of substitution 10
ρm interest rate smoothing 0.9
γpi response coefficient of expected inflation 1.5
γy response coefficient of output gap 0.5
This table collects the descriptions and values of important parameters of the model.
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Figure 1.1: Impulse responses in the case of a frictionless economy
This figure shows the impulse responses of key macroeconomic variables to a monetary policy
shock in the case of a frictionless economy, which means ϕp = 0 and ϕw = 0.
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Figure 1.2: Impulse responses in the case of sticky prices
This figure shows the impulse responses of key macroeconomic variables to a monetary policy
shock in the case of sticky prices, which means ϕp 6= 0 and ϕw = 0.
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Figure 1.3: Impulse responses in the case of sticky prices and sticky wages without spillover
effects
This figure shows the impulse responses of key macroeconomic variables to a monetary policy
shock in the case of sticky prices and sticky wages without spillover effects, which means
ϕp 6= 0, ϕw 6= 0, τ1 = 0, and τ2 = 0.
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Figure 1.4: Impulse responses in the case of sticky prices and sticky wages with spillover effects
This figure shows the impulse responses of key macroeconomic variables to a monetary policy
shock in the case of sticky prices and sticky wages with spillover effects, which means ϕp 6= 0,
ϕw 6= 0, τ1 6= 0, and τ2 6= 0.
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Chapter 2
Labor market institutions and business
cycles
2.1 Introduction
Although there has been a significant progress in explaining the impacts of labor market
institutions (LMI) on macroeconomic performance, one aspect of this relationship still remains
unexplored: their impacts on business cycles. These institutions might have an impact on
business cycles due to a number of reasons. First, Calmfors and Driffill (1988) and Rumler
and Scharler (2009) claim that the characteristics of the wage bargaining process influence the
responses of macroeconomic variables to economic shocks. The behaviors of the bargaining
agents will influence the macroeconomic outcomes to the degree that they internalize the
macroeconomic consequences of their actions. Second, these institutions play a very important
role in determining the worker and job flows at the business cycle frequency. Therefore, LMI
might influence the responses of the macroeconomic variables to the disturbances.1 Third,
Veracierto (2008) discusses that some of these institutions are introduced by the policymakers
to reduce the magnitude of economic downturns. Finally, Abbritti and Weber (2008) argue
that the economies that are characterized by high levels of LMI will experience smoother
and more prolonged cycles compared to the economies characterized by low levels of LMI;
1For some examples see Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Bertola (1990), Garibaldi (1998), Blanchard and
Portugal (2001) and Pries and Rogerson (2005).
because high levels of LMI amplifies the adjustment via prices and restrict the responses of
real variables.
The main goal of this chapter is to investigate the impacts of LMI on business cycles;
however, there are various institutions employed in different countries.2 In the literature these
institutions are collected under three main categories - employment protection regulations (e.g.
firing costs, severance payments, lifetime employment), unemployment insurance benefits (e.g.
duration of benefits, replacement ratio) and collective bargaining (e.g. coverage of collective
bargaining, density, rules of bargaining, coordination between unions). In this chapter, I em-
ploy representatives of all of these categories. In particular, I look at the impacts of firing costs
measured by severance payments, unemployment benefits and bargaining power of workers on
business cycles.
In the literature there are a few theoretical studies that analyze the impacts of LMI on
business cycles to different extents. Alvarez and Veracierto (2000) build a Lucas-Prescott equi-
librium search model and investigate the role played by the labor market policies in explaining
the differences in employment across economies. Joseph, Pierrard and Sneessens (2003) focus
on the impacts of real wage rigidities as well as employment protection and unemployment
benefits within a variation of an RBC model. Pries and Rogerson (2005) develop a matching
model to account for the differences in the worker turnovers in the US and in the euro area.
Veracierto (2008) employs an RBC model to analyze the effects of firing costs on cyclical fluc-
tuations. All of these studies ignore inflation dynamics and nominal disturbances and some of
them do not incorporate labor market frictions in their analyses. Bowdler and Nunziata (2007),
Zanetti (2007) and Campolmi and Faia (2009) incorporate these features to their frameworks
and show that labor market frictions play an important role in explaining the impacts of LMI
on business cycles. Furthermore, Campolmi and Faia (2009) find that alternative institutions
will have a role in explaining the differentials in inflation volatilities across economies.
This chapter contributes to this literature by building a dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium search and match model by taking these findings into account. In particular, it builds
2For a list of these institutions, see Freeman (2008), page 3.
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a variation of Mortensen and Pissarides (MP) model.3 It extends the conventional MP model
with staggered wage contracts and nominal price rigidities.
The closest studies to this one in terms of the main question of interest and the methodology
are Zanetti (2007) and Abbritti and Weber (2008). The framework of this study differs from
Zanetti (2007) in two ways. First, that study considers only nominal price rigidity, however
in this study real wage rigidity is incorporated into the model. In the conventional model the
wages are determined by period-by-period Nash bargaining between firms and workers. This
results in a high volatility in real wage. To improve the empirical performance of the model
Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005) include an ad hoc real wage stickiness to the conventional
model. They find that sticky wages assumption improves the empirical performance of the
model. Moreover, although beyond the scope of this study, the model here is able to test the
arguments of Abbritti and Weber (2008) and Joseph et al. (2003). The former study claims
that real wage rigidities and labor market rigidities might have opposite effects on business
cycle fluctuations. The latter study argues that downward rigidities, rather than LMI, may play
a dominant role in explaining the cyclical properties of an economy. Secondly, I consider three
institutions where Zanetti (2007) considers only firing costs and unemployment benefits. The
difference between Abbritti and Weber (2008) and this study is that they do not focus on the
institutions per se. They look at the impacts of real wage rigidities and labor market frictions
on the business cycles and measure the frictions with the steady state values of unemployment
and job-finding rate. They do not identify the institutions where in this studythese institutions
are clearly modeled.
This work also contributes to the literature, pioneered by Trigari (2006) and Gertler and
Trigari (2009), which aims to replicate the observed dynamics of unemployment and inflation
by incorporating search and match labor market frictions into the standard New Keynesian
framework.4 This line of research has been criticized by not being able to capture the business
3Due to Pissarides (1990), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994, 1999) and Pissarides (2000).
4Some other examples of this literature are, Walsh (2005), Krause and Lubik (2007), Gertler, Sala and
Trigari (2008) and Sala, Soderstrom and Trigari (2008).
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cycle facts due to exogenous separation rate.5 This study incorporates endogenous separations
and sets a basis for a further analysis of the impacts of endogenous separations on the empirical
performance of this type of model.
To identify the impacts of LMI on business cycles I derive the impulse responses of key
macroeconomic variables to a monetary policy shock under alternative levels of institutions.
The results of this study are as follows. A change in the firing cost does not have a significant
impact on the impulse responses of the variables. An increase in the unemployment benefits
makes the output, employment, unemployment and inflation less responsive to the macroeco-
nomic disturbances. An increase in the bargaining power, however, increase the responses of
the real side of the economy where it reduces the response of inflation to a shock.
The next section lays out the main framework, which is very similar to the one built in
the previous chapter. Third section calibrates the model. In the fourth section, I present the
log-linearized version of the key equations of the model to derive the impulse responses under
alternative levels of institutions. Final section concludes the paper.
2.2 The Model
The agents in the economy are: households, intermediate goods producers, retailers, a final
good producer and a monetary authority. Households maximize their lifetime utility subject
to a budget constraint. The intermediate firms produce intermediate goods that are bought
by retailers and they face with labor market frictions. They hire workers through a search
and matching process and set their wages according to Calvo-type price setting framework.
Retailers operate in a monopolistically competitive market and set their prices as in Calvo
(1983). They transform one unit of intermediate good to a unit of retial good and sell it to
the final good producer. The final good producer collects all goods produced by retailers,
combines them via a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator and produces the consumption good. Finally,
the monetary authority employs a Taylor-type monetary policy rule and uses the nominal
interest rates as the instrument.
5See Ramey (2008) for a detailed discussion of exogenous versus endogenous separations.
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2.2.1 The Household
Households in the economy are distributed on a unit interval and are assumed to form a large
extended family. This family is simply referred as the household.6 At any point in time some
members of the family are employed. Rest of the members is unemployed and search for a job.
The household enjoys consumption and maximizes her lifetime utility subject to the budget
constraint. Formally, the problem of the household can be written as:
max Et
∞∑
t=0
βtlog(ct)
s.t. ct + kt+1 +
Bt
Ptrnt
= wtnt + (1− nt−1)b+ ρint nt−1Υ +
(zt + 1− δ)kt + Πt + Tt + Bt−1
Pt
(2.1)
ct, kt and Bt are consumption of the final good, saving in terms of capital and per-capita
holdings of a nominal one-period bond, respectively. wt is the aggregate wage rate paid to the
working members of the family and b is the unemployment benefits received by the unemployed
members. Υ denotes the amount of payment to a worker who is involuntarily separated7 in
the beginning of the period and δ stands for the depreciation rate of the capital. rnt represents
the nominal return from a one-period bond and Pt is the aggregate price level. The household
rents the capital she owns to the firms with a rental rate zt. Then the total income of the
household at time t is the sum of wage income of employed members, wtnt, unemployment
benefits received by unemployed members, b(1 − nt−1), total payments to the workers that
are separated involuntarily in the beginning of the period, ρint nt−1Υ, total rent income from
capital remaining after depreciation, (zt + 1 − δ)kt, the profits distributed by the firms, Πt,
total transfers from the government, Tt, and real return from bonds that the household bought
in the previous period, Bt−1Pt . Assuming that λt shows the marginal utility of consumption at
6To avoid the distributional problems among individuals it is assumed that the members of the family
combine their incomes and make the decision of consumption. This is a common assumption in the literature.
7The involuntary separations are further discussed below.
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date t, the first order conditions of the problem above can be written as:
λt = βEtλt+1
Pt
Pt+1
rnt (2.2)
λt = βEtλt+1[zt+1 + 1− δ] (2.3)
The real interest rate is defined in percentage terms: 1 + rt = Et
Pt
Pt+1
rnt .
2.2.2 Matching and production in intermediate market
In the intermediate market, the firms and workers meet on a matching market where firms
post vacancies and search for workers from an unemployment pool and workers search for
jobs. The matching function depends on the vacancies posted by the firms and the number of
unemployed workers. It is increasing in both of its arguments and represents constant returns
to scale.
mt = σmu
σ
t v
1−σ
t (2.4)
mt, ut and vt denote the matches within period t, the number of unemployed workers and the
number of vacancies posted at time t, respectively. σm measures the efficiency of the matching
process and σ ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of the matching with respect to unemployment. The
aggregate number of vacancies posted at time t and total employment in the economy are
given by vt =
∫ 1
0 vt(i)di and nt =
∫ 1
0 nt(i)di. The number of unemployed workers at time t will
be the difference between the unity and the number of workers employed in the beginning of
the period.
ut = 1− nt−1 (2.5)
Let qt denote the probability an open vacancy is going to be matched with a searching
worker and st denote the probability a worker searching for a job is going to be matched with
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an open vacancy; then, it is convenient to define
qt =
mt
vt
= σmθ
−σ
t and st =
mt
ut
= σmθ
1−σ
t (2.6)
θt measures the labor market tightness and is defined as the ratio of the number of open
vacancies to the number of job-seeking workers, θt =
vt
ut
.
The intermediate goods producers are distributed on the unit interval. They have access to
a Cobb-Douglas type production function. Intermediate firm i rents capital from households,
kt(i), and hires workers, nt(i). The total production of the firm, yt(i), is given by
yt(i) = kt(i)
αnt(i)
1−α (2.7)
In the literature it is common to define the hiring rate, xt(i), as the ratio of new hires to
the existing workforce.
xt(i) =
qtvt(i)
nt−1(i)
(2.8)
The workforce of the firm at time t is the sum of the surviving workers from the previous
period and current hires. I assume that new workers immediately go to work. Therefore, the
total workforce at time t will be
nt(i) = (1− ρt(i))nt−1(i) + qtvt(i) (2.9)
The separation can occur due to reasons such as migration, death, retirement,...etc, or due to
exogenous shocks which results in involuntary separations. The rate of former type of separa-
tions is assumed to be constant and denoted by ρx. The latter separation rate is represented
by ρint . Therefore, the total separations rate is given by
ρt = ρx + ρ
in
t (2.10)
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I also assume that involuntary separations follow an AR(1) process.
ρint = ρ
in
t + ρρρ
in
t−1 + ε
ρ
t with ε
ρ
t ∝ NIID(0, σ2ρ) (2.11)
Given the evolution of the workforce and the hiring rate, the value of firm i at time t can be
described as:
Ft(i) = p
w
t yt(i)− wt(i)nt(i)−
κ
2
xt(i)
2nt−1(i)
−ρint Υnt−1(i)− ztkt(i) + βEtΛt,t+1Ft+1(i) (2.12)
The firm’s discount factor is denoted by EtΛt,t+1 = Et
λt+1
λt
, relative price of the good that the
firm produces is given by pwt and the ongoing wage rate at firm is represented by wt(i). p
w
t
is also the marginal cost of the retailer who buys this intermediate good. It is assumed that
only the workers that are separated due to exogenous shocks are eligible to receive severance
payments. Therefore, the total severance payments made by the firm is ρint Υnt−1(i). The firm
also bears labor adjustment cost, which is paid in terms of the final good and is a function of
the firm’s hiring rate, κ2xt(i)
2.
The wage rate at each intermediate firm is different because at any period only a fraction
of the firms are allowed to bargain their wages with their existing workforces. If a firm is
allowed to bargain its wage, it will go through the bargaining process over the new wage. If it
is not allowed to bargain, the previous period’s wage will prevail.
At each period the firm maximizes its value with respect to vacancies and capital stock
given its existing employment stock, probability of filling a vacancy, the rental rate and current
and expected path of the real wage. The first order conditions are:
κxt(i) = p
w
t fnt(i)− wt(i) + βEtΛt,t+1
[
(1− ρt+1)κxt+1 + κ
2
xt+1(i)
2 − ρint+1Υ
]
(2.13)
zt = αp
w
t
yt(i)
kt(i)
(2.14)
Here, fnt(i) = (1−α) yt(i)nt(i) , is the marginal product of labor. The firm chooses the employment
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level by choosing the hiring rate. The equation 2.13 represents the hiring decision of the firm.
Equation 2.14 gives the capital decision. Due to the assumptions that the capital market is
perfectly competitive and capital is free to move, the output/capital ratios are equal across
the firms. Therefore, I can drop the indices in equation 2.14 and say zt = αp
w
t
yt
nt
.
It is convenient to derive the marginal contribution of a worker to the firm’s value as:
∂Ft(i)
∂nt(i)
= Jt(i) = p
w
t fnt(i)− wt(i) + βEtΛt,t+1
∂Ft+1(i)
∂nt(i)
= κxt(i) (2.15)
This value will be used in the bargaining process. By using the hiring decision, equation 2.15
can be revised as:
Jt(i) = p
w
t fnt(i)− wt(i) + βEtΛt,t+1
[κ
2
xt+1(i)
2 − ρnt+1Υ
]
+ βEtΛt,t+1(1− ρt+1)Jt+1(i)(2.16)
Before defining the bargaining process, I will discuss the value of each state to the workers.
To derive the value of being unemployed, Ut, first the average value of all vacancies posted in
that period, Vx,t, should be derived. Since the unemployed worker does not know which firm
she is going to be matched with, she considers Vx,t during her job search. This value is given
by
Vx,t =
∫ 1
0
Vt(i)
xt(i)nt−1(i)
xtnt−1
di =
1
vt−1
∫ 1
0
Vt(i)vt−1(i)di (2.17)
In the current period the unemployed worker receives unemployment benefits, b. In the next
period the unemployed worker will find a successful match with probability st+1 and with
probability 1− st+1 the worker will be unemployed again.
Ut = b+ βEtΛt,t+1 [st+1Vx,t+1 + (1− st+1)Ut+1] (2.18)
The unemployment benefits are calculated as a fraction, b¯, of the worker’s marginal contribu-
tion to the production and firm’s savings from labor adjustment cost.
The value of being employed at firm i at time t, Vt(i), is the sum of the wage that the
49
worker is receiving from the firm at the current period and expected discounted return in the
next period. At time t + 1 the worker will either work for the same firm or be separated
from the firm. The worker will be eligible for unemployment benefits once she is separated.
Moreover, if the worker is involuntarily separated from the firm, the worker will receive a
severance payment. Therefore,
Vt(i) = wt(i) + βEtΛt,t+1
[
(1− ρt)Vt+1(i) + ρint+1(Υ + Ut+1) + ρxUt+1
]
(2.19)
In the wage setting process a Calvo-type price-setting framework is employed. It is assumed
that the probability that a firm is allowed to re-negotiate its wage at each period follows a
Poisson process. At any point in time an intermediate firm will change its wage with probability
1 − ϕw. Therefore, the average duration of the wage at a firm is 11−ϕw . The probability that
a firm can re-negotiate its wage is independent from its negotiation history.
In the bargaining process, the total surplus generated from the contract is distributed
according to the bargaining powers of each party. This process is summarized by:
max Ht(r)
ηJt(r)
1−η (2.20)
Ht(r) stands for the surplus of an average negotiating worker once she accepts a job and Jt(r)
denotes the value of adding another worker to the firm. Since only a fraction of the firms are
allowed to bargain at time t, the firms that are bargaining and that are not bargaining have
to be distinguished. This distinction is made by indexing the bargaining ones with r. The
surplus of the worker from accepting a job with firm i, Ht(i), and the average surplus of a
worker hired at time t, Hx,t are defined as:
Ht(i) = Vt(i)− UtHx,t = Vx,t − Ut (2.21)
Plugging the values of being employed and unemployed to the worker and rearranging the
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terms result in:
Ht(i) = wt(i)− b− βEtΛt,t+1
[
st+1Hx,t+1 − ρint+1Υ
]
+ βEtΛt,t+1(1− ρt+1)Ht+1(i) (2.22)
The uncertainty about the time of the next negotiation period results in horizon effect, which
is discussed by Gertler and Trigari (2009) in details. Since both the firm and the worker do
not know when they will have a chance to re-negotiate, they consider the future path of the
wage during the bargaining. However, the worker considers only his tenure at the firm where
the firm has to think about its future workforce as well as its existing workforce. In other
words, the firm has a longer horizon than the worker. This effect is observed in the difference
between the firm’s cumulative discount factor, Σt(r), and the worker’s cumulative discount
factor, ∆t, which are given by
Σt(r) = Et
∞∑
s=0
(βϕw)
sΛt,t+s
nt+s
nt
(r) (2.23)
∆t = Et
∞∑
s=0
(βϕw)
sΛt,t+s(1− ρt+s) (2.24)
The discount factors are similar except the fact that the firm’s discount factor depends on the
employment of the firm at time t + s relative to time t, where the worker’s discount factor
depends on the expected survival rate. On the average nt+snt (r) > (1 − ρt+s), which implies
that the firm places relatively more weight on the future than does the worker.
Given these discount factors, the expected wage revenue of a bargaining worker and ex-
pected wage payment of a firm to its workers can be written as:8
Wwt (r) = ∆tw
∗
t + β(1− ϕw)EtΛt,t+1(1− ρt+1)∆t+1w∗t+1
β2(1− ϕw)EtΛt,t+2(1− ρt+1)(1− ρt+2)∆t+2w∗t+2 + ... (2.25)
W ft (r) = Σt(r)w
∗
t + (1− ϕw)Et
∞∑
s=1
βsΛt,t+s
nt+s
nt
Σt+s(r)w
∗
t+s (2.26)
8The appendix provides the details.
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The first order condition of the bargaining problem is:
η∆tJt(r) = (1− η)Σt(r)Ht(r) ⇒ χt(r) = Jt(r) = (1− χt(r))Ht(r) (2.27)
χt(r) denotes the relative weight in the sharing rule and is derived as χt(r) =
η
η+(1−η) Σt(r)
∆t
. Due
to constant returns assumption, each negotiating firm settles on the same wage rate, w∗t . In
other words, the firm bargains with the marginal worker instead of bargaining with its whole
existing workforce. Let wot (r) stand for the target wage, then, the following equation defines
the optimum bargained wage.
Σt(r)w
∗
t = w
o
t (r) + βϕwEtΛt,t+1
nt+1
nt
Σt+1(r)w
∗
t+1 (2.28)
where
wot (r) = χt(r)
[
pwt fnt(r)− βEtΛt,t+1
(κ
2
xt+1(r)
2 + ρint+1Υ
)]
+
(1− χt(r))
[
b+ βEtΛt,t+1
(
st+1Hx,t+1 − ρint+1Υ +
χt+1(r)
1− χt+1(r)κxt+1(r)
2
)]
(2.29)
According to the equation above, the target wage is a convex combination of the contribution
of a worker to the match and his foregone benefits from being unemployed.9 The average wage
in the economy can be driven by taking the average wage of all employed workers.
wt =
∫ 1
0
wt(i)
nt(i)
nt
di (2.30)
Using the law of large numbers and with the fact that only a fraction of the firms can change
their wages, the equation above can be rewritten as:
wt = (1− ϕw)w∗t + ϕw
∫ 1
0
wt−1(i)
nt(i)
nt
di (2.31)
9The target wage in Gertler and Trigari (2009) represents the wage that would arise under period-by-period
Nash bargaining, modified to allow for the horizon effect. In our case the target wage is also adjusted for
endogenous separations. I represent the bargained wage in this form to make it comparable with that of Gertler
and Trigari (2009).
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2.2.3 Retailers, final good market and monetary authority
The retailers are distributed on the unit interval. The only function of the retailers is to
buy intermediate goods, differentiate them with a technology that transforms one unit of
intermediate good at no cost, and re-sell it to the final good producer. Each retailer has a
monopolistic power on the good it produces and at any point in time only a fraction of the firms
are allowed to reset their prices. Marginal cost of buying an intermediate good is its relative
price. The final good producer uses a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator and produces the final good
that is directly sold to the consumers. The monetary authority uses the short-term nominal
interest rates as the policy instrument and employs a Taylor-type rule.
The total output produced in the economy can be written as:
yt =
[∫ 1
0
y
ε−1
ε
jt dj
] ε
ε−1
(2.32)
where the aggregate output, yt, is described in terms of each retailer’s output, yjt, and the
firm’s own price elasticity of substitution across differentiated retail goods, ε. The monopolistic
power of the retailers and Calvo-type price setting results in a nominal price rigidity in the
economy. The aggregate price level then is the aggregate of the nominal sale price of each
retailer’s product. Formally,
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
P 1−εjt dj
] 1
1−ε
(2.33)
Solving for the demand for each retail good results in
yjt =
[
Pjt
Pt
]ε
yt (2.34)
At any point in time each retailer can reset its price with a probability 1−ϕp. This probability
is independent from the firm’s price setting history. Therefore, the aggregate price index in
the economy is defined as:
Pt =
[
(1− ϕp)(P ∗t )1−ε + ϕp(Pt−1)1−ε
] 1
1−ε (2.35)
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where P ∗t is the optimal price for the firms that are able to reset their prices. The firm sets its
price for the expected number of periods that it will not be able to reset its price. P ∗t is the
solution to the following problem:
max Et
∞∑
s=0
(βϕp)
s
[
P ∗jt
Pt
− pwt+s
]−ε
(2.36)
subject to the demand for that good. The optimal price level for the firm that is able to change
its price is:
p∗jt =
ε
ε− 1Et
∑∞
s=0(βϕp)
sP εt+sp
w
t+syt+s∑∞
s=0(βϕp)
sP ε−1t+s yt+s
(2.37)
Finally, the model is completed with the monetary policy rule and market clearing condi-
tion.
rnt = β
−(1−ρm)(rnt−1)
ρmEt(pit+1)
γpi(1−ρm)(yzt )
γy(1−ρm)eε
m
t (2.38)
The degree of interest rate smoothing is captured by the parameter ρm. The monetary author-
ity responds to the output gap, denoted by yzt , and the expected inflation. The corresponding
response coefficients of the output gap and expected inflation are represented by γy and γp,
respectively. The monetary policy shock is represented by εmt , which is an i.i.d. process.
The market clearing condition for the final good is given by
yt = ct + kt+1 − (1− δ)kt + κ
2
x2tnt−1 (2.39)
The equation 2.39 states that the consumption of the household, ct, investment on capital,
kt+1− (1−δ)kt, and aggregate labor adjustment costs of the intermediate firms, κ2x2tnt−1, sum
up to the amount of final good produced in the economy.
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2.3 Calibration
To analyze the impacts of LMI, first the model is calibrated and then the steady state of the
model with zero inflation is derived. The parameters are calibrated for the US economy. Table
2.1 collects the values that are assigned to the parameters of the model and implied steady
state values of some key variables. The length of a period is assumed to be a quarter.
I start with setting the discount factor, β, to 0.99. This results in an approximately 4
percent annual real rate of interest. δ is set to 0.025; therefore, annual depreciation rate of
capital is around 10 percent. These values are consistent with Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (2005), Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2008) and Sala, Soderstrom and Trigari (2008). In the
literature, the steady state capital’s share of income, α, is found to be between 0.3 and 0.36.
The midpoint of these values is chosen and it is set to 0.33. The parameter that measures the
elasticity of matches to unemployment, σ, is calibrated as 0.5. This value is within the range
of the lowest and highest values assigned to this parameter in the literature, 0.4 and 0.72.10
The separation rate at the steady state has two components: ρx and ρ
in. According to Hall
(1995) and Davis, Haltiwanger and Shuh (1996) the average separation rate is between 0.08
and 0.1. Moreover, Gertler and Trigari (2009) argues that the average duration of a job in the
US is two and a half years. To match this fact, they set monthly separation rate to 0.035. In
this study I set the total separation rate to ten percent per quarter. To do that I set ρx = 0.09
and ρin = 0.01. To get the involuntary separations the other parameters determining that
value are set accordingly.
To be able to calibrate κ, first I need to determine the steady state value of job finding
rate, s. In the literature the values vary between 0.6 and 0.95. The studies that use a similar
model to the one employed here set s = 0.95. Therefore, I use the same value.
In order to match the average duration of a vacancy, the efficiency parameter in the match-
ing function, σm is calibrated as 0.925. With this calibration the probability a vacancy will
be filled at the steady state, q, is 0.9. The duration of an average vacancy is reported to be
under one month by Blanchard and Diamond (1989), which requires q to be 1. However, the
10See Blanchard and Diamond (1989) and Shimer (2005) for the lowest and highest values, respectively.
55
distinction between the removal time of the advertisement and actual date that the vacancy
is filled is pointed out by van Ours and Ridder (1992). In that study it is reported that in
the first two weeks after the vacancy is posted, seventy five percent of the vacancies are filled.
However, it takes around forty five days to choose the best applicant from the pool.
The probability that an intermediate firm is allowed to reset its wage at any point in time
is assumed to be 1 − ϕw = 1 − 0.718. In other words, a firm will be able to re-negotiate its
wage on average once in every three quarters.
The probability that a retailer is not allowed to change its price is set as ϕp = 0.6. This
value implies that an average firm will keep its price unchanged for around 2.5 quarters. This
is consistent with the literature and close to the empirical findings.11 Gertler, Sala and Trigari
(2008) and Sala, Soderstrom and Trigari (2008) assume that markup rate on marginal cost
is around 11 percent. This requires setting ε = 10. While calibrating the parameters of the
nominal interest rate rule Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) are followed and it is assumed that
ρm = 0.9, ϕp = 1.5 and γy = 0.5.
Finally, I calibrate the parameters that represent LMI. To save space I discuss only the
benchmark calibration of these parameters. In the impulse response analysis I consider al-
ternative values to examine their impacts on responses of variables. In the benchmark case I
set fr = 0.3, b¯ = 0.5 and η = 0.5. The first parameter represents the fraction of the average
wage paid to the separated worker as severance payment, Υ = fr ∗w. In the benchmark case,
the separated worker will receive 30 percent of the average wage in the economy. The total
unemployment benefits paid to a worker is b = b¯(pwfn + β
κ
2x
2), which is a fraction of the sum
of her possible contribution to the production and firm’s saving from labor adjustment cost.
Given this calibration the unemployment benefits will be fifty percent of this sum. Finally,
setting η = 0.5 results in an equal bargaining power to each bargaining agents.
Given this calibration, the steady state employment rate is 90 percent and unemployment
rate is 10 percent. The unemployment rate is much higher than the average unemployment
rate of the US in the last decades. However, in this model the workers do not have an option
11See Gali and Gertler (1999), Bils and Klenow (2002), Sbordone (2002) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (2005)
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of leaving the labor force and in the literature there is evidence that shows that the flow
from unemployed to employment and out-of-labor-force to employment are almost the same.
Therefore, setting unemployment to 10 percent is acceptable in this framework.
2.4 Log-linearization and impulse responses
To identify the impacts of the LMI on the impulse responses of variables to a monetary policy
shock, the key equations of the model are log-linearized around the steady state. A variable
with a hat denotes percentage deviation from its steady state value and a variable without a
hat and without a time subscript denotes the steady state value of the regarding variable. The
log-linearization process will start with the aggregate wage index.
wˆt = (1− ϕw)wˆ∗t + ϕwwˆt−1 (2.40)
The variations in the aggregate wage will be the weighted sum of the variations in the previous
period’s aggregate wage and in the bargained wage. The weights are determined by the
frequency of the wage bargaining in the intermediate market. The variations in the bargained
wage will be given by
Σˆt + wˆ
∗
t = Σ
−1wˆot (r) + ρβϕwEt [xˆt+1 − ρˆt+1] + βϕwEt
[
Λt,t+1 + Σˆt+1 + wˆ
∗
t+1
]
(2.41)
The percentage deviation of the target wage from its steady state is
wˆot (r) = χp
wfnw
−1
[
pˆwt + fˆnt
]
+
[(
s+
ρ
2
)
βχκx− βρinΥ
]
w−1EtΛt,t+1
βsχκxw−1Et
[
sˆt+1 + Hˆx,t+1
]
+
[
pwfn − b− βκx2 − (s+ ρ)βH
]
χw−1χˆt(r)
β
χ
1− χκx
2w−1Etχˆt+1(r) + βχκx2w−1Etxˆt+1(r)− βρinΥw−1Etρˆint+1 (2.42)
According to the equation 2.42, the variations in the target wage will be affected by the varia-
tions in the marginal worker’s contribution to the firm value and the worker’s foregone benefit
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from unemployment. These impacts are captured by the first three terms. Except the differ-
ences in the coefficients in front of these terms, these are the factors that affect the variations
in the target wage in the case of conventional period-by-period bargaining framework. Once
the sticky wages assumption is introduced, the horizon effect takes place. As discussed in
Gertler and Trigari (2009) there are two dimensions of the horizon effect. First, in the baseline
calibration, although η = 0.5, the effective bargaining power, χ, is 0.45. In other words, the
pure bargaining power will be lessened. Second, the variations in χt(r) will lead to variations
in the target wage. This effect is captured by the fourth term in the equation 2.42. The rest
of the terms are the results of endogenous separation and severance payment assumptions.
The variations in the separation rate have two effects on the target wage. First effect
is captured by the last term in the equation 2.42. The second effect operates through the
discount factor of the bargaining firm which in turn affects the expected variations in the
effective bargaining power of the worker, χˆt+1(r).
Σˆt(r) = βϕwEt
[
Λˆt,t+1 + ρ(xˆt+1(r)− ρˆt+1) + Σˆt+1(r)
]
(2.43)
Etχˆt+1(r) = −(1− χ)Et
[
Σˆt+1(r)− ∆ˆt+1
]
(2.44)
Although I do not investigate the impacts of spillover impacts, I revise the equation 2.42
as in Gertler and Trigari (2009). As derived in the appendix, the variations in the target wage
is
wˆot (r) = ϕfn
[
pˆwt + fˆnt
]
+ ϕχχˆt + ϕΛEtΛˆt,t+1 +
ϕx + ϕs
1− χ Etχˆt+1 + [ϕx + ϕs]Etxˆt+1
+ϕsEtsˆt+1 − βρinΥw−1Etρˆint+1 + τ1 (wˆt − wˆ∗t ) + τ2Et
(
wˆt+1 − wˆ∗t+1
)
(2.45)
where τ2 measures the direct spillover effect and τ1 measures the indirect spillover effect. The
market wage has a direct spillover effect on the bargained wage because the worker’s outside
option depends on the wage that she can expect to earn elsewhere. If the expected wage
exceeds the expected bargained wage, the outside option of the worker is good and the worker
will move to employment in the next period. This induces a spillover effect on the bargained
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wage. The indirect spillover effect stems from the difference between the hiring rate of the
bargaining firm and the average hiring rate. The appendix proves that there is a positive
relationship between this difference and the gap between average market wage and contract
wage.
xˆt+1(r) = xˆt+1 + wΣϕw (wˆt − wˆ∗t ) (2.46)
To save space rest of the log-linearized versions of the equations are presented in the appendix.
To analyze the impacts of LMI on the business cycles, I derive the impulse responses of key
macroeconomic variables to a monetary policy shock under alternative levels of institutions.
However, I do not report the results for the firing costs because a change in the firing cost
does not have an impact on the responses of macroeconomic variables. The firing cost appears
in the equations for the hiring rate and the bargained wage. Since the expected variation in
the involuntary separation is zero, the firing cost does not have an impact on the target wage.
Moreover, its impact on the hiring rate decreases to insignificant levels due to the same reason.
The literature does not provide a conclusive answer for the impacts of firing costs on the
business cycles. Although Rumler and Scharler (2009), Zanetti (2007) and Veracierto (2008)
report a negative relationship, Fonseca, Patureau and Sopraseuth (2007) and Joseph et al.
(2009) find almost no relationship. When the results of this study is compared with those of
Zanetti (2007), it is observed that the real wage rigidities play an important role. The period-
by period bargaining makes the real wage very sensitive to the severance payments. However,
if only a fraction of the firms are allowed to bargain at each period, the impacts of a change
in the severance payments on the responses decrease to insignificant levels.
Figure 2.1 plots impulse responses of the nominal interest rate, inflation, output, consump-
tion, employment, unemployment, hiring rate and the real wage to a one standard deviation
monetary policy shock under alternative levels of unemployment benefits. According to the
figure, the most significant impact of a change in unemployment benefits is on the responses
of real wage and inflation. A change in the benefits has a negative impact on the target wage,
therefore on the aggregate wage. This impact is carried onto inflation through marginal cost.
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This leads to the conclusion that as the unemployment benefits increase, the response of in-
flation decreases. These results are supported by the findings of Campolmi and Faia (2007)
and Zanetti (2007), where they find a negative impact of unemployment benefits on inflation
volatility. The responses of output, employment and unemployment decreases with an increase
in the unemployment benefits but these changes are not very significant.
Figure 2.2 shows the responses of key variables to the monetary policy shock under alter-
native values for worker’s bargaining power. The figure reveals the fact that the impacts of
a change in the worker’s bargaining power has opposite effects on the responses of the real
side of the economy with the impacts of a change in the unemployment benefits. Compared
to the influence of a change in unemployment benefits, the bargaining power has more impact
on responses of output, employment and unemployment. The figure plots that the higher the
bargaining power the more sensitive the output, consumption and employment to the mone-
tary policy shock. In the literature, the impacts of bargaining power on the business cycles
are ambiguous. Rumler and Scharler (2009) find a limited impact where Campolmi and Faia
(2007) report a positive impact. However, Fonseca et al. (2007) claim that the response of
employment is larger for lower bargaining power. The main reason for this ambiguity might be
the different aspects of collective bargaining. As discussed in Rumler and Scharler (2009) these
different aspects might have different impacts. Although they find that strong unionization
has a significantly positive impact on output volatility, the decisions given by the union and
coordination between the unions might reduce the impacts of disturbances on the economy.
When the change in the reponse of inflation to the monetary policy shock is considered, it is
seen that an increase in the bargaining power of the workers has a negative impact.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I investigate the impacts of alternative labor market institutions on the business
cycles. I consider three institutions which represent the main categorization of a variety of
labor market rules and regulations. I use firing cost to represent employment protection
institutions, unemployment benefits for unemployment insurance institutions and worker’s
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bargaining power for collective bargaining institutions.
To be able to identify the impacts of these institutions on the business cycles a dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium search and match model is employed. The impulse responses of
key macroeconomic variables to a monetary policy shock under alternative parameterization of
labor market institutions are derived. It is found that a change in the firing cost does not have
a significant impact on the impulse responses of the variables. As the unemployment benefits
are increased, all of the variables, including output and inflation, become less responsive to
the monetary policy shock. An increase in the worker’s bargaining power reduces the response
of inflation to the same shock and makes the real side of the economy more responsive to the
shocks.
This study can be extended in several directions. This study analyzes the impacts of labor
market institutions only in terms of the changes in the responses of the macroeconomic vari-
ables. A formal statistical analysis is required to measure the exact impacts of these institutions
on the behaviors of macroeconomic variables. Another direction would be investigating an op-
timal monetary policy under alternative levels of institutions since main impacts of changes
in the institutions fall on inflation. Furthermore, the framework built here can be used to
explore the explanatory powers of the labor market institutions on the differences between the
characteristics of the business cycles in alternative economies. In the literature there are a
lot of studies showing that these institutions are employed in different economies at different
levels. Therefore, these institutions might be responsible for the differences in the features of
busness cycles. However, to be able to start working on this direction, the differences between
the characteristics of the business cycles in different economies have to be analyzed.
In the next chapter I take upon this task and investigate the features of the business cycles
in different economies. I basically compare the characteristics of the US and the euro area
business cycles. I first define a business cycle and discuss the methodologies employed by the
National Bureau of Economic Research and the Center for Economic and Policy Research, since
these two organizations are assumed to be the main source for the dates in the business cycles.
Then I discuss the features of the business cycles derived by using the real gross domestic
product and industrial production. These two time series are the most commonly used series
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to derive the business cycles in the empirical literature. It is shown in the next chapter that
the US and the euro area countries business cycles exhibit very different characteristics. Thus,
it becomes a valid question that to what extent the labor market institutions are responsible
for these differences.
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Table 2.1: Benchmark Calibration
Parameter Description Value
β discount factor 0.99
δ capital depreciation rate 0.025
α share of capital income 0.33
ρ job separation rate 0.1
σ elasticity of matches to unemployment 0.5
b¯ unemployment insurance 0.5
η bargaining power 0.5
ϕp infrequency of price setting 0.6
ϕw infrequency of wage renegotiation 0.7
ε elasticity of substitution 10
ρm interest rate smoothing 0.9
γpi response coefficient of expected inflation 1.5
γy response coefficient of output gap 0.5
s job finding rate at steady-state 0.95
u unemployment rate at the steady state 0.5
n employment rate at the steady state 0.5
This table collects the values that are assigned to the parameters of the model and implied
steady state values of some key variables under the benchmark case. The parameters rep-
resenting the LMI are assigned different values while deriving the impulse responses. Other
values assigned for b¯ are 0.1 and 0.8 and for η are 0.2 and 0.5.
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Figure 2.1: Impulse responses under alternative levels of unemployment benefits
This figure shows the impulse responses of key macroeconomic variables to a monetary policy
shock under alternative levels of unemployment benefits levels. Black line with stars on it is
for b¯ = 0.1, red line with plus signs on it is for b=0.5, blue line with zeros on it is for b¯ = 0.72.
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Figure 2.2: Impulse responses under alternative levels of worker’s bargaining power
This figure shows the impulse responses of key macroeconomic variables to a monetary policy
shock under alternative levels of worker’s bargaining power. Black line with stars on it is for
η = 0.2, red line with plus signs on it is for η = 0.5, blue line with zeros on it is for η = 0.8.
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Chapter 3
Characteristics of the business cycles in the
US and the euro area
3.1 Introduction and business cycles
The previous chapter showed that alternative levels of institutions might create different re-
sponses for macroeconomic variables at the business cycle frequency. These institutions are
employed in many countries at different levels.1 Therefore, the explanatory power of these in-
stitutions on the differences between the characteristics of business cycles in different economies
will be a good research path to follow. The main question will be to what extent these institu-
tions are responsible for the differences in the features of business cycles in different economies.
However, before attempting to answer this question, the differences between the characteristics
of the business cycles among alternative economies have to be explored. This chapter of my
dissertation takes upon this task. With this chapter, I do not aim to make an original contri-
bution to the literature but rather try to set a basis for my future research. The comparison
will be particularly between the business cycles of the US and the euro area countries.
The modern literature on business cycles dates back to the seminal work of Burns and
Mitchell (1946), in which business cycles are defined as: “Business cycles are a type of fluc-
tuation found in aggregate economic activity of nations that organize their work mainly in
1For a detailed discussion of the usage of each institution around the world; see Belot and van Ours (2001),
Howell, Baker, Glyn and Schmitt (2006) and Freeman (2008).
business enterprises: a cycle consists of expansions occurring at the same time in many eco-
nomic activities, followed by similarly general recessions, contractions, and revivals that merge
into the expansion phase of the next cycle; this sequence of changes is recurrent but not pe-
riodic; in duration business cycles vary from more than one year to ten to twelve years; they
are not divisible into shorter cycles of similar character with amplitudes approximating their
own.“ (p.3).
Based on the definition above the researchers used two broad definitions of the business
cycle: classical cycle and deviation (or growth) cycle. As explained by Artis, Marcelino and
Proietti (2004) the difference between these two definitions is the description of the turning
points, which are peak and trough. These turning points date that the economy switches from
expansion to recession and vice versa. A turning point is called a peak (trough) when a(n)
decline (upturn) in real economic activity is observed. The phase starting right after a peak
until the next immediate trough is named as contraction2 and the period between a trough
and the next peak is called expansion. In the classical cycle case, selecting the turning points
is made on the basis of an absolute decline in the real economic activity. In the deviation cycle
case, turning points are defined with respect to the deviations of the rate of growth observed
in the variables representing the economic activity from an appropriately defined trend rate of
growth. It has been a challenge to find the best method to determine the turning points and
there are numerous techniques that have been developed in the literature.3
Many researchers assume that the chronologies provided by the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research (NBER) and the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) are the
“official” sources of peak and trough dates in the US and the euro area.4 The former organi-
zation has been doing research on the business cycles of the US for a long time. They provide
a business cycle chronology for the US economy. The latter one establishes the chronology
2Sometimes these contractions are named as recessions.
3Since the evaluation of all of these techniques is beyond the scope of this paper, I will refer the readers to
Boldin (1994) for a detailed discussion on this issue.
4Both organizations have a Business Cycle Dating Committee to maintain the chronologies of the business
cycles in the two areas.
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of contractions and expansions of the 11 original euro area member countries plus Greece for
1970 - 1998, and of the euro area as a whole from 1999 onwards.
As discussed in the next section, the committees of the NBER and CEPR consider several
different time series while determining the turning points in the economic activity. However,
in the empirical literature it is very difficult to replicate or test the validity of the dates
declared by these organizations, since they utilize from a variety of time series and the weight
of each series in the decision process is not revealed. Therefore, as pointed out by Boldin
(1994), for a technique to be qualified as a useful one, a procedure first needs a careful and
clear documentation of the data that is examined. In the literature several different series
have been used to approximate the business cycles. Among these series, the most commonly
used series are: quarterly measured real gross domestic product series and monthly measured
industrial production series. The researchers apply the classical business cycle or the deviation
business cycle definition to these series.5
While applying the definitions above on the time series and analyzing the business cycles,
the researchers focus on three features: length, depth and shape. Harding and Pagan (2002)
summarizes how these features are measured. For the first feature, they consider the duration
of an expansion and a recession. The duration of an expansion (recession) is the time spent
between the trough (peak) and the following peak (trough). For the second feature the re-
searchers use amplitude, which is interpreted as the percentage that have been lost (gained)
during a(n) recession (expansion). To measure the amplitude they compare the log level of
the time series at two consecutive turning points. Finally, to consider the shape of a business
cycle they use “excess“, which measures the departures of the actual time series path from
a hypothetical path if the transition between two consecutive turning points was linear. The
main idea is to examine whether the business cycle phase is concave or convex.
The aim of this chapter is to compare the characteristics of the business cycles in the US
and the euro area countries. Since the chronologies provided by the NBER and CEPR are
assumed to be the main source of the dates of turning points in the two areas, I start the
5For some examples see Artis et al. (2004), Bergman (2004), Canova et al (2004), Camacho et al. (2008),
Cesaroni et al. (2008) and Giannone et al. (2009).
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comparison with the chronologies provided by these two organizations. Then, I look at the
business cycles derived from the real GDP and industrial production.
According to the comparison of the business cycles dated by the NBER and CEPR, expan-
sion phases of the business cycles are much longer than the contraction phases in both areas.
However, the contraction period of the euro are business cycle is almost two times longer than
that in the US. Similarly, the expansion period is much longer in the euro area than in the US.
While comparing the business cycles with GDP and industrial production series, I rely on
two recent studies; Cesaroni, Maccini and Malgarini (2009) and Camacho, Perez-Quiros and
Saiz (2008). The former study compares the business cycles derived from the real GDP of
the US and the euro core countries. The latter study uses stationary bootstrap and model-
based clustering methods to analyze the similarities and differences among the business cycles
derived from industrial production of a large set of countries.
Cesaroni et al. (2009) finds that the US experiences on the average longer recessions than
the euro core countries. The average loss during a recession in the US is higher than that of all
of the euro core countries. As for the expansions in the US and in the euro core countries, the
average gain during an expansion in the US is higher than the average gain in Germany and
Italy, which have almost the same average length of expansion with the US. The average gain
in France during an expansion is higher than all other countries but also has a longer average
duration of expansion as well.
Camacho et al. (2008) does a similar analysis with the industrial production data. Accord-
ing to their findings the average expansion period in the US is longer than all of the euro area
countries except Ireland. The average duration of recession in most of the euro area countries
is longer than that in the US. Finally, the average gain during an expansion and the average
loss during a recession in the US are lower than those in most of the European countries.
To sum up, the business cycles across Atlantic exhibit different characteristics. However,
the results of a comparison will depend on the definition of the turning points and the time
series considered. For instance, average duration of an expansion is shorter in the US than in
France and Germany when GDP is used where it is longer in the US than in Germany and
France when industrial production is considered. Average gain in GDP during an expansion
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in the US is lower than that in France where average gain during an expansion in industrial
production is higher in the US.
The next section first discusses and compares the chronologies of the business cycles pro-
vided by NBER and CEPR. Then, it looks at the characteristics of the GDP business cycles
in the euro core countries and the US and industrial production business cycles for a larger
set of countries. The final section concludes the paper.
3.2 Business cycles in the US and in the euro area
The first mean of the comparison will be the chronologies provided by the NBER and CEPR.
These two organizations date the peaks and troughs in the business cycles of the US and the
euro area, respectively. Although these two organizations employ a similar definition for the
turning points in the business cycles, the methodologies they use show a few differences. These
differences are discussed below. Then, I compare the characteristics of the real GDP business
cycles and industrial production business cycles in the US and the euro area. I consider
the findings of two recent studies: Cesaroni et al. (2009) and Camacho et al. (2008). The
former study compares the business cycles derived from the real GDP of the US and the euro
core countries6 where the latter study uses stationary bootstrap and model-based clustering
methods to analyze the similarities and differences among the business cycles derived from
industrial production of a large set of countries.
3.2.1 The NBER and CEPR chronologies
The dating committee of the NBER has been maintaining the chronology of the business cycles
in the US for a very long time. The first trough that the NBER identified is as early as 1857.
The complete list of the dates of the peaks and troughs determined by the NBER can be found
in the official website of the organization.7 However, the CEPR has been providing the same
6Euro core countries are France, Germany and Italy. It is very difficult to find a reliable GDP data for most
of the European countries, therefore, the analysis here is bounded with only the Euro core countries and the
US.
7http://www.nber.org/cycles/
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chronology starting from only the seventies. Therefore, during the comparison I consider the
business cycles identified only after the seventies. But before looking at the dates provided
by these organizations, I will discuss the differences between the methods of the NBER and
CEPR.8
First of all the NBER business cycle dating committee defines a recession as a significant
decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a few months. In
other words, the committee primarily maintains a monthly chronology. However, the CEPR
committee maintains only a quarterly chronology due to the lack of a reliable monthly Eu-
ropean data. Therefore, the CEPR defines a recession as a significant decline in the level
of economic activity spread the economy of the euro area, usually visible in two or more
consecutive quarters of negative growth in economic activity.
Second, while identifying the dates in the business cycles, the NBER committee considers
several different series at both monthly and quarterly frequencies such as real gross domestic
product, real gross domestic income, payroll employment measure, real personal income less
transfer payments, real manufacturing and wholesale-retail trade sales, industrial production,
and employment estimates based on the household survey. The CEPR committee, however,
views the real GDP as the main source of macroeconomic activity.
Third, the CEPR monitors country statistics along with the euro area aggregates to make
sure that expansions or recessions are widespread over the countries of the area. The committee
does not use a fixed rule by which country information is weighted. Despite the differences in
the methodologies used by the NBER and CEPR, it will be very informative to look at the
chronologies provided by the NBER and CEPR.
Although the primary role of the NBER committee is to maintain a monthly chronology,
it also provides a quarterly chronology. This make it easier to compare the features of the
business cycles in the two areas. Table 3.1 provides the peaks and troughs declared by the
business cycle committees in the two areas after the seventies. According to that table, on the
average, the length of an expansion is much longer than the length of a recession in both areas.
8For further discussion on the differences between the methodologies used by the NBER and CEPR visit
http://www.cepr.org/data/Dating/cepr-nber.asp.
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In other words, both business cycles of the US and the aggregate euro area are characterized
by long periods of expansions and short periods of declines in real economic activity. However,
the averages of the durations of contractions and expansions in the two areas show that both
of the phases of the business cycle are shorter in the US than in the euro area. A contraction
period lasts on the average almost two times longer in the euro area than in the US where an
expansion period lasts on the average almost four years longer in the euro area than in the
US.
3.2.2 GDP cycles
As explained in the previous section the NBER and CEPR committees consider several different
time series while determining the turning points in the economic activity. This makes it very
difficult to use the definitions of these organizations in the empirical studies. Therefore, the
researchers use different time series to approximate the business cycle. The two most commonly
used time series are the real gross domestic product and industrial production. They apply
the classical cycle or deviation cycle definitions on these series and investigate the features of
the business cycles.
In this study, I consider two recent studies, Cesaroni et al. (2009) and Camacho et al.
(2008), that compare the characteristics of the business cycles in different economies by ap-
plying the classical cycle definition on the real GDP and industrial production, respectively. I
focus on the classical cycle definition due to two reasons. First, in the literature there is a big
debate on finding the most appropriate method to extract a trend from the data while using
the deviation cycle definition.9 Second, the definition used by the NBER and CEPR are closer
to the classical cycle definition.
Before going into the details of the studies I want to mention the fact that comparison of
the results of these studies might be misleading due to a couple of reasons. First, industrial
production data can show different characteristics than gross domestic product data. Within
the same quarter there might be two turning points. These points will be ignored in an
9See Artis et al. (2004) and thereference therein for further discussion.
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analysis that uses GDP. Secondly, the industrial production data is available for much longer
time periods for a lot of countries.
Cesaroni et al. (2009) investigates the features of the business cycles in the US and the
euro core countries by applying the classical definition on the real GDP. Table 3.2 collects
the characteristics of the real GDP business cycles of the countries considered in that study.
It shows the averages of duration, amplitude and the value for the measure of excess during
an expansion and a recession. Although on average the expansion period lasts longer than
contraction period in every country, the average lengths of expansions and recessions vary a
lot across countries. The average duration of an expansion swings from 16.22 (Italy) quarters
to 33.5 (France) quarters where the maximum and minimum average durations of a recession
is 2.67 (France) quarters and 3.20 (the US) quarters, respectively.
According to the amplitudes during the two phases of the business cycles, the average gain
during an expansion is very high in France and the US. Average loss during a recession is very
high in absolute value in the US compared to the euro core countries. The average gain during
an expansion in Germany and Italy is lower compared to the others.
Final feature to compare is the excess of movements observed in the business cycles. A value
of excess close to zero indicates that the cyclical fluctuation is almost linear in its behavior.
A negative (positive) number for the excess during an expansion implies a concave (convex)
expansion, which means the gain in output intensifies (slows down) towards the end of the
expansion. A similar description can be made for the contraction period. During a recession a
negative (positive) number for the excess implies a concave (convex) recession, which indicates
an intensification in the output loss towards (at) the end (beginning) of the recession. Given
these definitions and the measures in the table 3.3, all countries experience concave expansions
and convex recessions. The highest number for excess in the recession column is for the US
business cycle this means that the recessions in the Euro core countries are more linear than
recessions in the US.
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3.2.3 Industrial production cycles
Cesaroni et al. (2009) does the same analysis above with the industrial production data and the
first finding is that industrial production fluctuates more than total GDP in all the countries
considered. I will, however, look at Camacho et al. (2008) while comparing the features of
industrial production business cycles across countries, since it considers a larger set of countries
than Cesaroni et al. (2009). In their study, Camacho et al. (2008), applies the classical cycle
definition on the industrial production of countries including the euro area countries10 (except
Malta) and the US.11 The statistics for the euro area countries and the US are collected in
table B.5.
According to that table, the average duration of a recession varies from 11 months (Slovakia
and Ireland) to 24 months (Greece) and the average duration of an expansion varies between
18.5 months (Italy) and 47 months (Ireland). In other words, the average durations of two
phases of the business cycles vary a lot across the countries. it is also observed that the
recession in the US is shorter and the expansion is longer on the average than those of most
of the euro area countries.
When the averages of the amplitudes during an expansion in the industrial production are
compared, it is seen that it differs a lot. The gain in the euro core countries seems very limited.
A similar result can also be seen in the average loss during a recession. The average loss in
the euro core countries during a recession is lower than the average loss in most of the other
countries. The most striking result regarding the comparison of the recessions in the US and
in the euro area countries is that the average loss in the US industrial production is lower or
equal to that in all of the euro area countries. In other words, the US industrial production
does not decrease during a recession as much as it does in the euro area countries.
As for the comparison of the excess of the business cycles in the US and in the euro
area countries, the expansions and recessions in the industrial production are almost linear
10Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain.
11Other countries considered in that study are Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary,
Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Turkey and the UK.
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in the large economies like euro core countries and the US. Most of the economies experience
concave expansions and concave recessions. Finally, the US, France and Germany have convex
expansions and concave recessions where Italy experiences concave expansions and recessions.
3.3 Conclusion
This study compares the characteristics of the business cycles of the US and the euro area
countries. Seminal work of Burns and Mitchell (1946) is the study that the modern literature
on business cycles has been based on. The researchers following that study came up with
two broad definitions for the business cycle: classical cycle and deviation cycle. These two
definitions differ basically with respect to the definitions of the turning points. In this study,
however, I concentrate on the classical cycle definition since the definitions used by the NBER
and CEPR are closer to that definition. These organizations maintain the chronologies of the
business cycles by analyzing a variety of time series. Moreover, there is still a debate on the
best way of defining an appropriate trend rate of growth.
Since the business cycles determined by the NBER and CEPR are assumed to be the
“official” sources of peak and trough dates in the US and the euro area, I first compare the
durations of expansions and recessions provided by these two organizations. According to
the chronologies provided by the NBER and CEPR, the expansions last much longer than
recessions in both areas. However, the contraction period of the euro are business cycle is
almost two times longer than that in the US and the expansion period is much longer in the
euro area than that in the US.
The NBER and CEPR consider a variety of times series while determining the turning
points in the economic activity. Moreover, they do not explicitly declare the weight of the
times series considered in the decision process. Several different techniques have been developed
and several different time series have been used to approximate the business cycle. The two
most common time series used in the literature are the gross domestic product and industrial
production. The researchers focused on three features while analyzing the characteristics of
the business cycles: length or duration of contractions and expansions, depth or amplitude of
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the loss or gain during a recession and an expansion and shape of the business cycle.
While comparing the characteristics of the business cycles derived by GDP and industrial
production, I consider the findings of two recent studies; Cesaroni et al. (2009) and Camacho
et al. (2008), respectively. Former study finds that the US experiences on the average longer
recessions than the euro countries. The average loss during a recession is higher in the US
than that of all of the euro core countries. The average gain during an expansion in the US
is higher than the gain in Germany and Italy, which have almost the same average length of
expansion with the US. The average gain in France during an expansion is higher than all
other countries but also has a longer average duration of expansion as well.
According to the findings of Camacho et al. (2008), on the average, the expansion period
in the US is longer than all of the euro area countries except Ireland. The average duration
of a recession in most of the euro area countries is longer than that in the US. Finally, the
average gain during an expansion the loss during a recession in the US is lower than that in
most of the European countries.
As a conclusion it can be said that the results of a comparison of the features of the
business cycles of the euro area and the US differ depending on the time period considered
and data used in the analysis. However, the main result still stands, the business cycles have
very different characteristics in the two areas.
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Table 3.1: Comparison of the US and the euro area business cycles according to the NBER
and CEPR dates
The US The euro area
Contractions 1973(IV) - 1975(I) 5* 1974(III) - 1975(I) 2
1980(I) - 1980(III) 2 1980(I) - 1982(III) 10
1981(III) - 1982(IV) 5 1992(I) - 1993(III) 6
1990(III) - 1991(I) 2
2001(I) - 2001(IV) 3
Average 3.4 6
Expansions 1975(I) - 1980(I) 20 1975(I) - 1980(I) 30
1980(III) - 1981(III) 4 1982(III) - 1992(I) 28
1982(IV) - 1990(III) 31 1993(III) - 2008(I) 57
1991(I) - 2001(I) 36
2001(IV) - 2007(IV) 24
Average 23 38
*All data provided here is in terms of quarters.
This table shows the contractions and expansions identified by the NBER and CEPR in the US
and in the euro area. NBER provides both monthly and quarterly chronologies where CEPR
is able to provide only a quarterly one due to monthly data availability problem. Therefore,
during the comparison will be based on quarterly chronologies. Although the NBER maintains
a chronolgy for a very long time, CEPR starts analyzing the data after the seventies. Thus,
the comprison between the business cycles in the two areas is made for after the seventies.
Table 3.2: Business cycle characteristics with GDP - Euro core countries and the US
Countries Expansion Contraction
Duration Amplitude Excess Duration Amplitude Excess
the US 17.50* 18.07 -8.00 3.20 -2.04 0.38
Germany 18.29 14.61 -6.50 3.00 -1.44 0.24
France 33.50 21.63 -10.17 2.67 -1.25 0.16
Italy 16.22 14.25 -6.25 3.11 -1.32 0.23
*All data provided here is in terms of quarters.
This table was taken from Table 1 of Cesaroni et al. (2009), pg. 14. It shows the duration,
amplitude and excess values for expansions and contractions of the business cycles identified
by applying the classical cycle definition on the real gross domestic product.
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Table 3.3: Business cycle characteristics with industrial prodcution - The euro area countries
and the US
Countries Expansion Contraction
Duration Amplitude Excess Duration Amplitude Excess
Austria 35.50* 0.18 0.15 13.00 -0.06 -0.02
Belgium 28.00 0.12 0.03 18.75 -0.08 0.04
Cyprus 23.50 0.14 0.22 22.00 -0.16 0.17
Finland 33.33 0.22 0.35 14.25 -0.09 -0.07
France 30.67 0.08 0.04 18.50 -0.04 -0.05
Germany 22.75 0.08 0.04 13.17 -0.06 -0.02
Greece 30.33 0.12 0.31 23.67 -0.09 0.08
Ireland 47.33 0.45 0.44 10.67 -0.16 0.07
Italy 18.50 0.08 -0.01 16.67 -0.05 -0.04
Luxemburg 28.33 0.17 0.36 15.50 -0.12 -0.05
Netherlands 31.33 0.10 -0.18 17.67 -0.07 -0.12
Portugal 28.00 0.14 -0.28 22.00 -0.12 -0.17
Slovakia 36.33 0.21 0.18 11.00 -0.09 0.05
Slovenia 27.67 0.15 -0.21 16.33 -0.11 -0.04
Spain 32.25 0.12 0.11 14.25 -0.07 0.00
the US 34.00 0.14 0.04 14.00 -0.04 -0.03
*All data provided here is in terms of months.
This table is produced from the table 2 of Camacho et al. (2008), page 2178. It shows the
duration, amplitude and excess values for expansions and contractions of the business cycles
identified by applying the classical cycle definition on the industrial production. The business
cycle characteristics are calculated by using the stationary bootstrap method.
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Appendix A
Dynamics of the model in “Staggered wage
contracts and Nash bargaining”
A.1 Deriving the equilibrium wage rate
• To derive the equilibrium wage, first the sum of the expected wages is derived. Then, the
surpluses of the bargaining worker and the bargaining firm are derived. The expected lifetime
wage revenues of a worker negotiating at time t depends on whether the relationship will
survive or not. It can be written as:
Wwt (r) = Et
∑∞
s=0(ρβ)
sΛt,t+swt+s(r)
Then, by using the fact that Etwt+1(r) = ϕww
∗
t + (1− ϕw)Etw∗t+1 I can rewrite the equation
above as
Wwt (r) = Et[1+ρβϕwΛt,t+1 +(ρβϕw)
2Λt,t+2 +(ρβϕw)
3Λt,t+3 + ...]w
∗
t +(1−ϕw)ρϕwEtΛt,t+1[1+
ρβϕwEtΛt+1,t+2 + (ρβϕw)
2EtΛt+1,t+3 + ...]w
∗
t+1+...
The discount factor for the worker can be defined as ∆t = Et
∑∞
s=0(ρλϕw)
sΛt,t+s. Therefore,
Wwt (r) = ∆tw
∗
t + (1− ϕw)Et
∑∞
s=1(ρβ)
sΛt,t+s∆t+sw
∗
t+s
The expected wage payments of the firm, W ft , can be written as:
W ft (r) = Et
∑∞
s=0
nt+s
nt
(r)βsΛt,t+swt+s(r)
⇒
W ft (r) = Et[1+
nt+1
nt
(r)βϕwΛt,t+1 +
nt+2
nt
(r)(βϕw)
2Λt,t+2 + ...]w
∗
t +(1−ϕw)Et nt+1nt (r)βΛt,t+1[1+
nt+2
nt+1
(r)βϕwΛt+1,t+2 +...]w
∗
t+1 +(1−ϕw)Et nt+2nt (r)β2Λt,t+2[1+
nt+3
nt+2
(r)βϕwΛt+2,t+3 +...]w
∗
t+2 +...
Defining the discount factor of the firm as Σt(r) = Et
∑∞
s=0
nt+s
nt
(r)(βϕw)
sΛt,t+s yields
W ft (r) = Σt(r)w
∗
t + (1− ϕw)Et
∑∞
s=1
nt+s
nt
(r)βsΛt,t+sΣt+s(r)w
∗
t+s
• Ht(r) is the surplus of the negotiating worker and given by:
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Ht(r) = wt(r)− b+ βEtΛt,t+1[ρHt+1(r)− st+1Hx,t+1]
⇒
Ht(r) = Et
∑∞
s=0(ρβ)
sΛt,t+swt+s(r)− Et
∑∞
s=0(ρβ)
sΛt,t+s[b+ st+sβΛt+s,t+s+1Hx,t+s+1]
⇒
Ht(r) = W
w
t (r)− Et
∑∞
s=0(ρβ)
sΛt,t+s[b+ st+sβΛt+s,t+s+1Hx,t+s+1]
Finally, substituting Wwt (r) results in
Ht(r) = ∆tw
∗
t−Et
∑∞
s=0(ρβ)
sΛt,t+s
[
b+ βΛt+s,t+s+1
(
st+s+1Hx,t+s+1 − (1− ϕw)ρ∆t+s+1w∗t+s+1
)]
• The surplus of the firm, Jt(r), has to be log-linearized before log-linearizing the bargained
wage.
Jt(r) = p
w
t fnt − wt(r)− βEtΛt,t+1 κ2x2t+1 + βEtΛt,t+1 nt+1nt (r)Jt+1(r)
⇒
Jt(r) = Et
∑∞
s=0
nt+s
nt
(r)βsΛt,t+s
[
pwt+sfnt+s − βΛt+s,t+s+1 κ2x2t+s+1
]−W ft (r)
• The bargained wage can be driven by plugging the surpluses into the first order condition of
the Nash bargaining problem:
χt(r)[Et
∑∞
s=0(ρβ)
sΛt,t+s[p
w
t+sfnt+s+βΛt+s,t+s+1(
κ
2x
2
t+s+1−(1−ϕw)ρ∆t+s+1w∗t+s+1)]−∆tw∗t ] =
(1−χt(r))
[
∆tw
∗
t − Et
∑∞
s=0(ρβ)
sΛt,t+s[b+ βΛt+s,t+s+1(st+s+1Hx,t+s+1 − (1− ϕw)ρ∆t+s+1w∗t+s+1)]
]
⇒
∆tw
∗
t = Et
∑∞
s=0(ρβ)
sΛt,t+s[χt(r)(p
w
t+sfnt+s + βΛt+s,t+s+1
κ
2x
2
t+s+1)+
(1− χt(r))(b+ βst+s+1Λt+s,t+s+1Hx,t+s+1)− (1− ϕw)ρβΛt+s,t+s+1∆t+s+1w∗t+s+1]
Furthermore, a recursive equation for the equilibrium wage can be derived by rearranging the
terms such that
∆tw
∗
t = χt(r)
[
pwt fnt + βEtΛt,t+1
κ
2xt+1(r)
2
]
+ (1− χt(r)) [b+ βEtΛt,t+1st+1Hx,t+1]−
(1− ϕw)ρβEtΛt,t+1∆t+1w∗t+1 + ρβEtΛt,t+1∆t+1w∗t+1
⇒
∆tw
∗
t = w
o
t (r) + ρβϕwEtΛt,t+1∆t+1w
∗
t+1
where wot (r) is the target wage and given by
wot (r) = χt(r)
[
pwt fnt + βEtΛt,t+1
κ
2xt+1(r)
2
]
+ (1− χt(r)) [b+ βEtΛt,t+1st+1Hx,t+1]
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A.2 Log-linearizing the bargained wage
Before log-linearizing the bargained wage, the percentage deviation of the target wage from
its steady state has to be derived.
wot (r) = χt(r)p
w
t fnt + χt(r)βEtΛt,t+1
κ
2xt+1(r)
2 + b+ βEtΛt,t+1st+1Hx,t+1(1− χt(r)b−
χt(r)βEtΛt,t+1st+1Hx,t+1
⇒
wo(r)(1 + ŵot (r)) = χp
wfn(1 + χ̂t(r) + p̂
w
t + f̂nt) + χβ
κ
2x
2(1 + χ̂t(r) + Λ̂t,t+1 + 2x̂t+1) + b +
sβH(1 + ŝt+1 + Λ̂t,t+1 + Ĥt+1)− χb(1 + χ̂t(r))− χsβH(1 + χ̂t + ŝt+1 + Λ̂t,t+1 + Ĥt+1)
where at the steady state w = χ(r)pwfn +χ(r)β
κ
2x
2 + b− bχ(r) + sβHx−χ(r)sβHx. Getting
rid of the constant term renders in
wŵot (r) = χp
wfn(p̂
w
t + f̂nt) +χ(p
wfn +β
κ
2x
2− b− sβH)χ̂t(r) +χβκx2x̂t+1(r) + (χβ κ2x2 + (1−
χ)sβH)Λ̂t,t+1 + (1− χ)sβH(ŝt+1 + Ĥt+1)
⇒
ŵot (r) = χp
wfnw
−1(p̂wt + f̂nt) + χw−1[pwfn + β
κ
2x
2 − b− sβχκx(1−χ) ]χ̂t(r) + χβκx2w−1Etx̂t+1(r) +
χβ κ2x
2w−1EtΛ̂t,t+1 + sβχκxw−1Et(ŝt+1 + Ĥt+1 + Λ̂t,t+1)
• To find x̂t(r), the unconditional average of the hiring rate can be defined as:
xt =
∫ 1
0 xt(i)
nt(i)
nt
di
with
κxt(i) = p
w
t fnt − wt(i) + βEtΛt,t+1 κ2xt+1(i)2 + ρβκEtΛt,t+1xt+1(i)]
Combining these equations and log-linearizing around the steady state yields
x̂t(r) = p
wfn(p̂
w
t + f̂nt)− wŵt(r) + βEtx̂t+1(r) + β2 (1 + ρ)EtΛ̂t,t+1
Then, the difference between the hiring rate of the bargaining firm and the average hiring rate
is
x̂t(r)− x̂t = w(ŵt − ŵt(r)) + βEt(x̂t+1(r)− x̂t+1)
iterating this equation forward provides
x̂t(r)− x̂t = w(ŵt − ŵt(r)) + βwEt (ŵt+1 − ŵt+1(r)) + β2wEt (ŵt+2 − ŵt+2(r)) +
β3wEt (ŵt+3 − ŵt+3(r)) + ...
This equation can be simplified by using the real wage index.
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ŵt = ϕwŵt−1 + (1− ϕw)ŵ∗t
⇒
Etŵt+1 = ϕwŵt + (1− ϕw)Etŵ∗t+1
⇒
Etŵt+2 = ϕwŵt+1 + (1− ϕw)Etŵ∗t+2
It is also known that expected bargained wage for the next period is the convex combination
of the optimum bargained wage at next period and the optimum wage of the current period.
ŵt(r) = ŵ
∗
t
⇒
Etŵt+1(r) = ϕwŵ
∗
t + (1− ϕw)Etŵ∗t+1
⇒
Etŵt+2(r) = ϕwŵ
∗
t+1 + (1− ϕw)Etŵ∗t+2
Thus,
Et (ŵt+1 − ŵt+1(r)) = ϕw (ŵt − ŵ∗t )
⇒
Et+1 (ŵt+2 − ŵt+2(r)) = ϕw
(
ŵt+1 − ŵ∗t+1
)
Using the fact that
Etŵt(r) = ŵ
∗
t ⇒ Et+1ŵt+1(r) = ŵ∗t+1.
and taking the expectation of both sides:
Etŵt+1(r) = Etŵ
∗
t+1 ⇒ ϕwŵ∗t + (1− ϕw)Etŵ∗t+1 = Etŵ∗t+1 ⇒ ŵ∗t = Etŵ∗t+1.
Therefore,
Et+1 (ŵt+2 − ŵt+2(r)) = ϕw
(
ŵt+1 − ŵ∗t+1
)
⇒
Et [Et+1 (ŵt+2 − ŵt+2(r))] = Et
[
ϕw
(
ŵt+1 − ŵ∗t+1
)]
⇒
Et [ŵt+2 − ŵt+2(r)] = ϕw
(
Etŵt+1 − Etŵ∗t+1
)
⇒
Et [ŵt+2 − ŵt+2(r)] = ϕw(ϕwŵt + (1− ϕw)Etŵ∗t+1 − Etŵ∗t+1)
⇒
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Et [ŵt+2 − ŵt+2(r)] = ϕ2w(ŵt − Etŵ∗t+1)
⇒
Et [ŵt+2 − ŵt+2(r)] = ϕ2w(ŵt − ŵ∗t )
Then,
x̂t(r)− x̂t = w(ŵt − ŵt(r)) + βwEt (ŵt+1 − ŵt+1(r)) + β2wEt (ŵt+2 − ŵt+2(r)) + ...
⇒
x̂t(r)− x̂t = w(ŵt− ŵt(r)) +βϕww(ŵt− ŵ∗t ) + (βϕw)2w(ŵt− ŵ∗t ) + (βϕw)3w(ŵt− ŵ∗t ) + ...
⇒
x̂t(r) = x̂t+wΣ(ŵt−ŵ∗t )⇒ x̂t+1(r) = x̂t+1+wΣϕw(ŵt−ŵ∗t )⇒ x̂t+2(r) = x̂t+2+wΣϕ2w(ŵt−
ŵ∗t ) and so forth.
• Following the same path for the weights in the Nash bargaining first order condition yields
Σ̂t(r) = xβϕwx̂t+1(r) + βϕwEt(Λ̂t,t+1 + Σ̂t+1(r))
⇒
Σ̂t = xβϕwx̂t+1 + βϕwEt(Λ̂t,t+1 + Σ̂t+1)
⇒
Σ̂t(r)− Σ̂t = xβϕw(x̂t+1(r)− x̂t+1) + βϕwEt(Σ̂t+1(r)− Σ̂t+1)
⇒
Σ̂t+1(r)− Σ̂t+1 = xβϕw(x̂t+2(r)− x̂t+2) + βϕwEt(Σ̂t+2(r)− Σ̂t+2)
Therefore,
Σ̂t(r)− Σ̂t = xβϕw[(x̂t+1(r)− x̂t+1) + βϕwEt(x̂t+2(r)− x̂t+2) + (βϕw)2(x̂t+3(r)− x̂t+3) + ...]
⇒
Σ̂t(r)− Σ̂t = xΨΣw(ŵt − ŵ∗t )
where Ψ = βϕ
2
w
1−βϕ2w ,  = (κx)
−1 and Σ = 11−βϕw .
• The first order condition of the Nash bargaining is log-linearized as
χ̂t(r) = −(1− χ)(Σ̂t(r)− ∆̂t)
Averaging this accross all firms will give
χ̂t(r)− χ̂t = −(1− χ)(Σ̂t(r)− Σ̂t)
⇒
χ̂t(r) = χ̂t − (1− χ)xΨΣw(ŵt − ŵ∗t )
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and
Etχ̂t+1(r) = Etχ̂t+1 − (1− χ)xΨΣwϕw(ŵt − ŵ∗t )
• To finish the analysis for the spillover effects, I need to log-linearize the worker’s and firm’s
surpluses. The worker’s surplus is given by
Ht(i) = wt(i)− b+ βEtΛt,t+1 [ρHt+1(i)− st+1Hx,t+1]
Then, the percentage deviation of the worker’s surplus from its steady state is:
H(1+Ĥt(r)) = w(1+ŵt(r))−b+ρβHEt(1+Λ̂t,t+1+Ĥt+1(r))−sβHEt(1+Λ̂t,t+1+ŝt+1+Ĥx,t+1)
Canceling the constant terms and using the fact that Ĥt = Ĥx,t results in
HĤt(r) = wŵt(r) + ρβHEt(Λ̂t,t+1 + Ĥt+1(r))− sβHEt(Λ̂t,t+1 + ŝt+1 + Ĥt+1)
⇒
HĤt = wŵt + ρβHEt(Λ̂t,t+1 + Ĥt+1) + sβHEt(Λ̂t,t+1 + ŝt+1 + Ĥt+1)
⇒
H(Ĥt(r)− Ĥt) = w(ŵt(r)− ŵt) + ρβHEt(Ĥt+1(r)− Ĥt+1)
⇒
Ĥt(r)− Ĥt = wH−1(ŵt(r)− ŵt) + ρβEt(Ĥt+1(r)− Ĥt+1)
iterating the equation above forward yields
Ĥt(r) = Ĥt − wH−11−ρβϕw (ŵt − ŵ∗t )
At the steady state H = χκx1−χ and ∆ =
1
1−ρβϕw . Then, this equation can be revised as
Ĥt = Ĥt(r) + (1− χ)χ−1∆w(ŵt − ŵ∗t )
From solution to the Nash bargaining problem it is known that
χt(r)Jt(r) = (1− χt(r))Ht(r)
⇒
Ĥt(r) = Ĵt(r) + (1− χ)−1χ̂t(r)
Using x̂t(r) = x̂t + wΣ(ŵt − ŵ∗t ), χ̂t(r) = χ̂t − (1− χ)xΨΣw(ŵt − ŵ∗t ), and Ĵt(r) = x̂t(r)
Ĥt = Ĥt(r) + (1− χ)χ−1∆w(ŵt − ŵ∗t )
⇒
Ĥt = Ĵt(r) + (1− χ)−1χ̂t(r) + (1− χ)χ−1∆w(ŵt − ŵ∗t )
⇒
Ĥt = x̂t(r) + (1− χ)−1χ̂t(r) + (1− χ)χ−1∆w(ŵt − ŵ∗t )
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⇒
Ĥt = x̂t +wΣ(ŵt− ŵ∗t ) + (1−χ)−1(χ̂t− (1−χ)xΨΣw(ŵt− ŵ∗t )) + (1−χ)χ−1∆w(ŵt− ŵ∗t )
⇒
Ĥt = x̂t + (1− χ)−1χ̂t +
[
Σw − xΨΣw + (1− χ)χ−1∆w] (ŵt − ŵ∗t )
⇒
Ĥt = x̂t + (1− χ)−1χ̂t +
[
Σ− xΨΣ + (1−χ)χ ∆
]
w(ŵt − ŵ∗t )
⇒
Ĥt = x̂t + (1− χ)−1χ̂t +
[
η−1 − (1− ρ)Ψ] Σw(ŵt − ŵ∗t )
where η = χΣ(1−χ)∆+χΣ and x = (1− ρ). The equation above can be rewritten as:
Ĥt = x̂t + (1− χ)−1χ̂t + Γ(ŵt − ŵ∗t )
⇒
ÊtHt+1 = Etx̂t+1 + (1− χ)−1Etχ̂t+1 + ΓEt(ŵt+1 − ŵ∗t+1)
where Γ = (1− ηxΨ)Σwη−1. Now the target wage is:
ŵot (r) = χp
wfnw
−1(p̂wt + f̂nt) + χw−1[pwfn + β
κ
2x
2 − b− sβχκx(1−χ) ]χ̂t(r) + χβκx2w−1Etx̂t+1(r) +
χβ κ2x
2w−1EtΛ̂t,t+1 + sβχκxw−1Et(ŝt+1 + Ĥt+1 + Λ̂t,t+1)
⇒
ŵot (r) = ϕfn(p̂
w
t + f̂nt) + ϕχχ̂t(r) + ϕxEtx̂t+1(r) + (
ϕx
2 + ϕs)EtΛ̂t,t+1 + ϕsEtŝt+1 + ϕsEtĤt+1
where ϕfn = χp
wfnw
−1, ϕχ = χw−1[pwfn + β κ2x
2 − b − sβχκx(1−χ) ], ϕx = χβκx2w−1 and ϕs =
sβχκxw−1.
ŵot (r) = ϕfn(p̂
w
t + f̂nt) +ϕχ[χ̂t− (1−χ)(1−ρ)ΨΣw(ŵt− ŵ∗t )] +ϕx[x̂t+1 +wΣϕw(ŵt− ŵ∗t )] +
(ϕx2 + ϕs)EtΛ̂t,t+1 + ϕsEtŝt+1 + ϕsEt[x̂t+1 + (1− χ)−1χ̂t+1 + Γ(ŵt+1 − ŵ∗t+1)]
⇒
ŵot (r) = ϕfn(p̂
w
t + f̂nt) + ϕχχ̂t + ϕs(1− χ)−1Etχ̂t+1 + (ϕx + ϕs)Etx̂t+1 + (ϕx2 + ϕs)EtΛ̂t,t+1 +
ϕsEtŝt+1 + [ϕxΣϕww − ϕχ(1− χ)(1− ρ)ΨΣw](ŵt − ŵ∗t ) + ϕsΓEt(ŵt+1 − ŵ∗t+1)
Thus,
ŵot (r) = ŵ
o
t +
τ1
1−ρβϕwEt(ŵt+1 − ŵ∗t+1) + τ21−ρβϕw (ŵt − ŵ∗t )
where
ŵot = ϕfn(p̂
w
t +f̂nt)+ϕχχ̂t+ϕs(1−χ)−1Etχ̂t+1+(ϕx+ϕs)Etx̂t+1+(ϕx2 +ϕs)EtΛ̂t,t+1+ϕsEtŝt+1
with τ1 = ϕsΓ(1− ρβϕw), τ2 = [ϕxΣϕww − ϕχ(1− χ)(1− ρ)ΨΣw](1− ρβϕw)
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Now it is easy to derive the percentage deviation of the bargained wage form its steady state.
∆tw
∗
t = w
o
t (r) + ρβϕwEtΛt,t+1∆t+1w
∗
t+1
⇒
∆w(1 + ∆̂t + ŵ
∗
t ) = w
o(1 + ŵot (r)) + ρβ∆ϕww
∗Et(1 + Λ̂t,t+1 + ∆̂t+1 + ŵ∗t+1)
It can easily be shown that at the steady state w = w∗ = wo(r). Therefore,
∆(1 + ∆̂t + ŵ
∗
t ) = (1 + ŵ
o
t (r)) + ρβ∆ϕwEt(1 + Λ̂t,t+1 + ∆̂t+1 + ŵ
∗
t+1)
⇒
∆̂t + ŵ
∗
t = (1− ρβϕw)ŵot (r) + ρβϕwEt(Λ̂t,t+1 + ∆̂t+1 + ŵ∗t+1)
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Appendix B
Dynamics of the model in “Labor market
institutions and business cycles”
B.1 Expected wage revenue of a negotiating worker, Wwt (r)
The expected lifetime wage revenues, which depends on whether the relationship will survive
or not, of a worker negotiating at time t can be written as
Wwt (r) = wt(r) + βEtΛt,t+1(1− ρt+1)wt+1(r) + β2EtΛt,t+2(1− ρt+1)(1− ρt+2)wt+2(r) +
β3EtΛt,t+3(1− ρt+1)(1− ρt+2)(1− ρt+3)wt+3(r) + ...
By using the fact that wt = (1 − ϕw)w∗t + ϕwwt−1 it can be said that wt(r) = w∗t . Then, in
the forthcoming periods
Etwt+1(r) = (1− ϕw)Etw∗t+1 + ϕww∗t
⇒
Etwt+2(r) = (1− ϕw)Etw∗t+2 + ϕww∗t+1 = ϕ2ww∗t + ϕw(1− ϕw)Etw∗t+1 + (1− ϕw)Etw∗t+2
⇒
Etwt+3(r) = (1− ϕw)Etw∗t+3 + ϕww∗t+2
⇒
Etwt+3(r) = ϕ
3
ww
∗
t + ϕ
2
w(1− ϕw)Etw∗t+1 + ϕw(1− ϕw)Etw∗t+2 + (1− ϕw)Etw∗t+3
and so on. Therefore,
Wwt (r) = w
∗
t +βEtΛt,t+1(1−ρt+1)[ϕww∗t +(1−ϕw)w∗t+1]+β2EtΛt,t+2(1−ρt+1)(1−ρt+2)[ϕ2ww∗t +
ϕw(1 − ϕw)w∗t+1 + (1 − ϕw)w∗t+2] + β3EtΛt,t+3(1 − ρt+1)(1 − ρt+2)(1 − ρt+3)[ϕ3ww∗t + ϕ2w(1 −
ϕw)w
∗
t+1 + ϕw(1− ϕw)w∗t+2 + (1− ϕw)w∗t+3] + ...
⇒
Wwt (r) = [1+βϕwEtΛt,t+1(1−ρt+1)+(βϕw)2EtΛt,t+2(1−ρt+1)(1−ρt+2)+(βϕw)3EtΛt,t+3(1−
91
ρt+1)(1− ρt+2)(1− ρt+3) + ...]w∗t + [β(1− ϕw)EtΛt,t+1(1− ρt+1) + β2ϕw(1− ϕw)EtΛt,t+2(1−
ρt+1)(1 − ρt+2) + β3ϕ2w(1 − ϕw)EtΛt,t+3(1 − ρt+1)(1 − ρt+2)(1 − ρt+3) + ...]w∗t+1 + [β2(1 −
ϕw)EtΛt,t+2(1−ρt+1)(1−ρt+2)+β3ϕw(1−ϕw)EtΛt,t+3(1−ρt+1)(1−ρt+2)(1−ρt+3)+...]w∗t+2+...
Assuming that
∆t = 1 + βϕEtΛt,t+1(1 − ρt+1) + (βϕw)2EtΛt,t+2(1 − ρt+1)(1 − ρt+2) + (βϕw)3EtΛt,t+3(1 −
ρt+1)(1− ρt+2)(1− ρt+3) + ...
⇒
∆t = 1 + βϕEtΛt,t+1(1− ρt+1)∆t+1
Then,
⇒
Wwt (r) = ∆tw
∗
t + β(1 − ϕw)EtΛt,t+1(1 − ρt+1)∆t+1w∗t+1 + β2(1 − ϕw)EtΛt,t+2(1 − ρt+1)(1 −
ρt+2)∆t+2w
∗
t+2 + ...
B.2 Expected surplus of the negotiating worker, Ht(r)
The average surplus of a worker hired at time t, Hx,t, is defined as Hx,t = Vx,t − Ut and the
surplus of a worker working at firm i is defined as Ht(i) = Vt(i) − Ut. Substituting Vt(i) and
Ut will yield
Ht(i) = wt(i)−b+βEtΛt,t+1[(1−ρt+1)Vt+1(i)+ρt+1Ut+1 +ρint+1Υ−st+1Vx,t+1−(1−st+1)Ut+1]
⇒
Ht(r) = wt(r)− b− βEtΛt,t+1[st+1Hx,t+1 − ρint+1Υ] + βEtΛt,t+1(1− ρt+1)Ht+1(r)
⇒
Ht+1(r) = wt+1(r)− b− βEtΛt+1,t+2[st+2Hx,t+2 − ρint+2Υ] + βEtΛt+1,t+2(1− ρt+2)Ht+2(r)
⇒
Ht+2(r) = wt+2(r)− b− βEtΛt+2,t+3[st+3Hx,t+3 − ρint+3Υ] + βEtΛt+2,t+3(1− ρt+3)Ht+3(r)
Then,
⇒
Ht(r) = wt(r) + βEtΛt,t+1(1 − ρt+1)wt+1(r) + β2EtΛt,t+2(1 − ρt+1)(1 − ρt+2)wt+2(r) − b −
βEtΛt,t+1(1 − ρt+1)b − β2EtΛt,t+2(1 − ρt+1)(1 − ρt+2)b − βEtΛt,t+1[st+1Hx,t+1 − ρint+1Υ] −
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β2EtΛt,t+2(1−ρt+1)[st+2Hx,t+2−ρint+2Υ]−β3EtΛt+1,t+3(1−ρt+1)(1−ρt+2)[st+3Hx,t+3−ρint+3Υ]+
βEtΛt+2,t+3(1− ρt+3)Ht+3(r)
⇒
Ht(r) = W
w
t (r)− [1 + βEtΛt,t+1(1− ρt+1) + β2EtΛt,t+2(1− ρt+1)(1− ρt+2) + ...]b
−βEtΛt,t+1[st+1Hx,t+1−ρint+1Υ]−β2EtΛt,t+2(1−ρt+1)[st+2Hx,t+2−ρint+2Υ]−β3EtΛt+1,t+3(1−
ρt+1)(1− ρt+2)[st+3Hx,t+3 − ρint+3Υ]
B.3 Expected surplus of the negotiating worker, W ft (r)
The expected lifetime wage payments of the bargaining firm at time t can be written as
W ft (r) = Et
∑∞
s=0 β
sΛt,t+s
nt+s
nt
(r)wt+s(r)
⇒
W ft (r) = wt(r) + βEtΛt,t+1
nt+1
nt
(r)wt+1(r) + β
2EtΛt,t+2
nt+2
nt
(r)wt+2(r) + ...
⇒
W ft (r) = w
∗
t + βEtΛt,t+1
nt+1
nt
(r)[ϕww
∗
t + (1 − ϕw)w∗t+1] + β2EtΛt,t+2 nt+2nt (r)[ϕ2ww∗t + ϕw(1 −
ϕw)w
∗
t+1 + (1 − ϕw)w∗t+2] + β3EtΛt,t+3 nt+3nt (r)[ϕ3ww∗t + ϕ2w(1 − ϕw)w∗t+1 + ϕw(1 − ϕw)w∗t+2 +
(1− ϕw)w∗t+3] + ...
⇒
W ft (r) = Et[1+βϕwΛt,t+1
nt+1
nt
(r)+(βϕw)
2Λt,t+2
nt+2
nt
(r)+ ...]w∗t +(1−ϕw)EtβΛt,t+1 nt+1nt (r)[1+
βϕwΛt+1,t+2
nt+2
nt+1
(r)+...]w∗t+1 +(1−ϕw)Etβ2Λt,t+1 nt+2nt (r)[1+βϕwΛt+1,t+2
nt+3
nt+2
(r)+...]w∗t+2 +...
If the discount factor for the firm is defined as
Σt(r) = Et
∑∞
s=0(βϕw)
sΛt,t+s
nt+s
nt
(r)
⇒
Σt(r) = 1 + βϕwEtΛt,t+1
nt+1
nt
(r)Σt+1(r)
Then
W ft (r) = Σt(r)w
∗
t + (1− ϕw)Et
∑∞
s=1 β
sΛt,t+s
nt+s
nt
(r)Σt+s(r)w
∗
t+s
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B.4 Expected surplus of the negotiating firm, Jt(r)
Having derived the expected wage revenues of a negotiating worker and expected wage pay-
ments of a negotiating firm, I can now derive the explicit functions of surpluses of firms and
workers.
Jt(r) = p
w
t fnt(r)− wt(r) + βEtΛt,t+1
[
κ
2xt+1(r)
2 − ρint+1Υ
]
+ βEtΛt,t+1(1− ρt+1)Jt+1(r)
Using the fact that nt+1(r) = (1 − ρt+1)nt(r) + qt+1vt+1(r) ⇒ (1 − ρt+1) = nt+1nt (r) − xt+1(r)
and Jt+1(r) = κxt+1(r), I can rewrite the equation above as
Jt(r) = p
w
t fnt(r)− wt(r)− βEtΛt,t+1
[
κ
2xt+1(r)
2 + ρint+1Υ
]
+ βEtΛt,t+1
nt+1
nt
(r)Jt+1(r)
⇒
Jt+1(r) = p
w
t+1fnt+1(r)−wt+1(r)−βEtΛt+1,t+2
[
κ
2xt+2(r)
2 + ρint+2Υ
]
+βEtΛt+1,t+2
nt+2
nt+1
(r)Jt+2(r)
and so forth. Therefore,
Jt(r) = Et
∑∞
s=0 β
sΛt,t+s
nt+s
nt
(r)
[
pwt+sfnt+s(r)− βΛt+s,t+s+1
[
κ
2x
2
t+s+1 + ρ
in
t+s+1Υ
]]
− Et
∑∞
s=0 β
sΛt,t+s
nt+s
nt
(r)wt+s(r)
⇒
Jt(r) = Et
∑∞
s=0 β
sΛt,t+s
nt+s
nt
(r)
[
pwt+sfnt+s(r)− βΛt+s,t+s+1
[
κ
2x
2
t+s+1 + ρ
in
t+s+1Υ
]]−W ft (r)
B.5 Deriving the contract wage
The Nash bargaining is summarized by
max Ht(r)
ηJt(r)
1−η
The first order condition will result in
η∆tHt(r)
η−1Jt(r)1−η = (1− η)Σt(r)Ht(r)ηJt(r)−η
⇒
η∆tJt(r) = (1− η)Σt(r)Ht(r)
Letting χt(r) =
η∆t
η∆t+(1−η)Σt(r) will provide χt(r)Jt(r) = (1− χt(r))Ht(r). Then
Ht(r) = wt(r)− b− βEtΛt,t+1[st+1Hx,t+1 − ρint+1Υ] + βEtΛt,t+1(1− ρt+1)Ht+1(r)
⇒
Ht(r) = wt(r)− b− βEtΛt,t+1
[
st+1Hx,t+1 − ρint+1Υ
]
+ βEtΛt,t+1
(
nt+1
nt
(r)− xt+1(r)
)
Ht+1(r)
⇒
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Ht(r) = wt(r)− b− βEtΛt,t+1
[
st+1Hx,t+1 − ρint+1Υ + χt+1(r)1−χt+1(r)κxt+1(r)2
]
+
βEtΛt,t+1
nt+1
nt
(r)Ht+1(r)
Then,
Ht+1(r) = wt+1(r)− b− βEtΛt+1,t+2
[
st+2Hx,t+2 − ρint+2Υ + χt+2(r)1−χt+2(r)κxt+2(r)2
]
+
βEtΛt+1,t+2
nt+2
nt+1
(r)Ht+2(r)
ans so forth. Thus,
Ht(r) = W
f
t (r)−
Et
∑∞
s=0 β
sΛt,t+s
nt+s
nt
(r)
[
b+ βΛt+s,t+s+1
(
st+s+1Hx,t+s+1 − ρint+s+1Υ + χt+s+1(r)1−χt+s+1(r)κxt+s+1(r)2
)]
I can derive the contract wage by substituting Ht(r) and Jt(r) into the first order condition of
the Nash bargaining.
χt(r)Jt(r) = (1− χt(r))Ht(r)
⇒
W ft (r) = χt(r)Et
∑∞
s=0 β
sΛt,t+s
nt+s
nt
(r)
[
pwt+sfnt+s(r)− βΛt+s,t+s+1
(
κ
2xt+s+1(r)
2 + ρint+s+1Υ
)]
+
[1− χt(r)]Et
∑∞
s=0 β
sΛt,t+s
nt+s
nt
(r)[
b+ βΛt+s,t+s+1
(
st+s+1Hx,t+s+1 − ρint+s+1Υ + χt+s+1(r)1−χt+s+1(r)κxt+s+1(r)2
)]
⇒
Σt(r)w
∗
t + (1− ϕw)Et
∑∞
s=1 β
s nt+s
nt
(r)Σt+s(r)w
∗
t+s =
χt(r)Et
∑∞
s=0 β
s nt+s
nt
(r)
[
pwt+sfnt+s(r)− βΛt+s,t+s+1
(
κ
2xt+s+1(r)
2 + ρint+s+1Υ
)]
+ [1− χt(r)]Et
∑∞
s=0 β
sΛt,t+s
nt+s
nt
(r)[
b+ βΛt+s,t+s+1
(
st+s+1Hx,t+s+1 − ρint+s+1Υ + χt+s+1(r)1−χt+s+1(r)κxt+s+1(r)2
)]
⇒
Σt(r)w
∗
t = χt(r)
[
pwt fnt(r)− βEtΛt,t+1
(
κ
2xt+1(r)
2 + ρint+1Υ
)]
+ (1− χt(r))
[
b+ βEtΛt,t+1
(
st+1Hx,t+1 − ρint+1Υ + χt+1(r)1−χt+1(r)κxt+1(r)2
)]
−
(1− ϕw)βEtΛt,t+1 nt+1nt (r)Σt+1(r)w∗t+1 + βEtΛt,t+1
nt+1
nt
(r)Σt+1(r)w
∗
t+1
⇒
Σt(r)w
∗
t = w
o
t (r) + βϕwEtΛt,t+1
nt+1
nt
(r)Σt+1(r)w
∗
t+1
where
wot (r) = χt(r)
[
pwt fnt(r)− βEtΛt,t+1
(
κ
2xt+1(r)
2 + ρint+1Υ
)]
+
(1− χt(r))
[
b+ βEtΛt,t+1
(
st+1Hx,t+1 − ρint+1Υ + χt+1(r)1−χt+1(r)κxt+1(r)2
)]
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B.6 Dynamics of the intermediate market
The target wage can be log-linearized as the following
wˆot (r) = χp
wfnw
−1
[
pˆwt + fˆnt(r)
]
+
[
pwfn − β κ2x2 − b− βsHx − β χ1−χκx2
]
χw−1χˆt(r) +[
(1− χ)βsHx − βρinΥ + βχκx22
]
w−1EtΛˆt,t+1 + βχκx
2
(1−χ)Etχˆt+1(r) +
βχκx2w−1Etxˆt+1(r)− βρinΥw−1Etρˆint+1 + (1− χ)βsHxw−1Et
[
sˆt+1 + Hˆx,t+1
]
Here I used the fact that f(xt) ≈ f(x) + f ′(x)(xt − x) ≈ f(x)(1 + υxˆt) where υ = ∂f(x)∂x xf(x) .
Due to constant returns fˆnt(r) = fnt and Hˆx,t = Hˆt. At the steady state Hx = H =
χJ
1−χ and
J = κx⇒ H = χκx1−χ . Therefore, the equation above can be revised such that.
wˆot (r) = χp
wfnw
−1[pˆwt + fˆnt] +
[
pwfn − b− β κ2x2 − (s+ ρ)βH
]
χw−1χˆt(r) +[(
s+ ρ2
)
βχκx− βρinΥ]w−1EtΛˆt,t+1 + β χ1−χκx2w−1Etχˆt+1(r) + βχκx2w−1Etxˆt+1(r)−
βρinΥw−1Etρˆint+1 + βsχκxw−1Et
[
sˆt+1 + Hˆx,t+1
]
To find the percentage deviation of the target wage from its steady state, I will follow the
footsteps in the appendix to the first chapter and start with the hiring rate of a bargaining
firm. It is given by
κxt(i) = p
w
t fnt(i)− wt(i) + βEtΛt,t+1
[
(1− ρt+1)κxt+1(i) + κ2xt+1(i)2 − ρint+1Υ
]
⇒
xˆt(r) = p
wfn
[
pˆwt + fˆnt
]
− wwˆt(r) +
(
1− ρ2 − ρinΥ
)
βEtΛˆt,t+1 + βEtxˆt+1(r) − ρβEtρˆt+1 −
βρinΥEtρˆ
in
t+1
where  = (κx)−1. At the steady state n = (1− ρ)n + qv and x = qvn , then x = ρ. Given the
equation above, the difference between the hiring rate of a bargaining firm and the aggregate
hiring rate will be given by
xˆt(r)− xˆt = w (wˆt − wˆt(r)) + βEt(xˆt+1(r)− xˆt+1)
iterating this equation forward will provide us
xˆt(r)− xˆt = w(wˆt − wˆt(r)) + βwEt(wˆt+1 − wˆt+1(r)) + β2wEt(wˆt+2 − wˆt+2(r)) + ...
I can simplify this equation by using the real wage index derived in the previous section by
xˆt(r) = xˆt + wΣ(wˆt − wˆ∗t )
where Σ = 11−βϕw . Then,
xˆt+1(r) = xˆt+1 + wΣ(wˆt+1 − wˆ∗t+1)
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I can borrow the percentage deviations of the Nash bargaining weight, employment rate and the
effective bargaining power from their steady states. Given these, I can derive the percentage
deviaton of the bargaining firm’s surplus from hiring another worker. That surplus is given by
Ht(r) = wt(r)− b− βEtΛt,t+1[st+1Hx,t+1 − ρint+1Υ] + βEtΛt,t+1(1− ρt+1)Ht+1(r)
Log-linearizing it around the steady state will yield
Hˆt(r)− Hˆt = wH−1 [wˆt(r)− wˆt] + β(1− ρ)Et
[
Hˆt+1(r)− Hˆt+1
]
where H−1 = 1−χχκx . Iterating the equation will give
Hˆt(r) = Hˆt − w∆H−1 (wˆt − wˆ∗t )
By using the log-linearization of the Nash bargaining condition it can be driven that
Hˆt = xˆt + (1− χ)−1χˆt +
[
(1− ρΨ)wΣ+ w∆H−1] (wˆt − wˆ∗t )
⇒
EtHˆt+1 = Etxˆt+1 + (1− χ)−1Etχˆt+1 +
[
(1− ρΨ)wΣ+ w∆H−1]Et (wˆt+1 − wˆ∗t+1)
Finally, the percentage deviation of the target wage from its steady state will be
wˆot (r) = ϕfn
[
pˆwt + fˆnt
]
+ϕχχˆt+ϕΛEtΛˆt,t+1+
ϕx+ϕs
1−χ Etχˆt+1+[ϕx+ϕs]Etxˆt+1−βρinΥw−1Etρˆint+1+
ϕsEtsˆt+1 + τ1 (wˆt − wˆ∗t ) + τ2Et
(
wˆt+1 − wˆ∗t+1
)
where
ϕfn = χp
wfnw
−1, ϕχ =
[
pwfn − b− β κ2x2 − (s+ ρ)βH
]
χw−1,
ϕΛ =
[(
s+ ρ2
)
χκx− ρinΥ]βw−1, ϕx = βχκx2w−1, ϕs = βsχκxw−1
τ1 = [ϕxϕw − (1− χ)ϕχρΨ]wΣ and τ2 =
[
(ϕx − ϕs) ρΨΣ+ ϕs
(
Σ+ ∆H−1
)]
w.
Given this equation, the percentage deviation of the bargained wage from its steady state will
be
Σˆt + wˆ
∗
t = Σ
−1wˆot (r) + ρβϕwEt [xˆt+1 − ρˆt+1] + βϕwEt
[
Λˆt,t+1 + Σˆt+1 + wˆ
∗
t+1
]
B.7 Complete log-linearized model
All of the equations that are used to derive the impulse response functions are collected below.
mˆt = σuˆt + (1− σ)vˆt
qˆt = mˆt − vˆt
sˆt = mˆt − uˆt
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yˆt = αkˆt − (1− α)nˆt
xˆt = qˆt + vˆt − nˆt−1
nˆt = (1− ρ)nˆt−1 + ρ (qˆt + vˆt − ρˆt)
ρˆt =
ρin
ρρ
ρˆint
ρˆint+1 = ρρρˆ
in
t
zˆt = pˆ
w
t + yˆt − kˆt
xˆt = p
wfn
[
pˆwt + fˆnt
]
−wwˆt+
(
1− ρ2 − ρinΥ
)
βEtΛˆt,t+1+βEtxˆt+1−ρβEtρˆt+1−βρinΥEtρˆint+1
fˆnt = yˆt − nˆt
uˆt = −nu nˆt−1
∆ˆ = (1− ρ)βϕwEt
[
Λˆt,t+1 + ∆ˆt+1
]
− ρβϕwEtρˆt+1
Σˆt = βϕwEt
[
Λˆt,t+1 + ρ (xˆt+1 − ρˆt+1) + Σˆt+1
]
χˆt = −(1− χ)
[
Σˆt − ∆ˆt
]
Σˆt + wˆ
∗
t = Σ
−1wˆot (r) + ρβϕwEt [xˆt+1 − ρˆt+1] + βϕwEt
[
Λˆt,t+1 + Σˆt+1 + wˆ
∗
t+1
]
wˆot (r) = ϕfn
[
pˆwt + fˆnt
]
+ϕχχˆt+ϕΛEtΛˆt,t+1+
ϕx+ϕs
1−χ Etχˆt+1+[ϕx+ϕs]Etxˆt+1−βρinΥw−1Etρˆint+1+
ϕsEtsˆt+1 + τ1 (wˆt − wˆ∗t ) + τ2Et
(
wˆt+1 − wˆ∗t+1
)
wˆt = (1− ϕw)wˆ∗t + ϕwwˆt−1
λˆt = Et
(
λˆt+1 − pˆit+1
)
+ rˆnt
λˆt = Et
(
λˆt+1 + βzzˆt+1
)
λˆt = −cˆt
EtΛˆt,t+1 = Etλˆt+1 − λˆt
rˆnt = Etpˆit+1 + (1− β)rˆt
rˆnt = ρmrˆ
n
t−1 + γpi(1− ρm)Etpˆit+1 + γy(1− ρm)yˆt + εmt+1
yˆt =
c
y cˆt +
k
y
[
kˆt+1 − (1− δ)kˆt
]
+ κx
2n
2y [2xˆt + nˆt]
pˆit = θpˆ
w
t + βEtpˆit+1
θˆt = vˆt − uˆt
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